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BOSTON UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis

HOCKING'S ETHICAL THEORY

Submitted by

Helen Proctor

(Ph.B., Denison U., 1925)

In partial fulfilment of requirements for

the degree of Master of Arts

1928

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OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION:

A. Statement of the problem.	1
1. Its limits.	1
2. Its significance.	2
B. Materials and methods.	3
I. Human nature: some facts basic to a theory of ethics.	5
A. Instincts.	5
1. Range: difficulty of determining.	5
2. Central instincts: necessary interests.	6
B. The will.	7
1. Definition.	7
a. Relation to the central instincts.	7
b. A fundamental human will.	8
2. The will to power.	9
a. Relation to Nietzsche's "will to power".	9
b. Definition and Function.	10
c. Cooperation with outer factors in experience.	11
d. Determination of the "mental-after-image".	11
e. Dialectic of the will.	12
3. "Will-circuits."	14
a. Definition.	14
b. Relation to the state.	14
(1) Sociability and economic forces insufficient.	15
(2) The state as will-circuit.	16

INTRODUCTION

1	A. Statement of the problem
2	1. Its limits
3	2. Its significance
4	B. Materials and methods
5	1. Human nature: some facts basic to a theory of ethics
6	A. Instincts
7	1. Range: difficulty of determining
8	2. Central instincts: necessary interests
9	B. The will
10	1. Definition
11	a. Relation to the central instincts
12	b. A fundamental human will
13	2. The will to power
14	a. Relation to Nietzsche's "will to power"
15	b. Definition and formation
16	c. Cooperation with other factors in experience
17	d. Determination of the "mental-ether-impulse"
18	e. Dialectic of the will
19	3. "Will-circuits"
20	a. Definition
21	b. Relation to the state
22	(1) Sociality and economic forces in individuality
23	(2) The state as will-circuit

D. Conscience.	18
1. Obligation as socially developed.	18
2. Obligation as a unique experience.	18
3. Relation to instinct.	19
II. Fundamental theory of value.	20
A. Satisfaction of the whole self.	20
1. Discipline versus liberation.	21
2. An independent standard.	22
B. Value and the "whole-idea".	22
1. Idea basic in morals.	22
2. Idea of reality: the whole-idea.	24
a. Determinant of values.	25
b. The real as the good.	25
c. Transition to the God-idea.	26
C. Disvalue: sin.	26
1. Sin as deed.	27
2. Sin as status.	27
3. Existence of moral dilemmas.	28
III. Evaluation of society and the state.	30
A. Four postulates of a good society.	30
1. Identity of the social will with the individual will.	31
a. Helps toward achievement of this ideal.	31
b. Its insufficiency.	32
2. Subordination of competitive to non-competitive interests.	32
a. Possibility of attainment of this ideal.	33
b. Necessity of the state for its realization.	34

3. Provision for change in institutions.	34
4. Conserving force proportionate to certainty.	35
B. The state.	37
1. Necessity for the state.	37
a. Psychological basis: will-circuits.	37
b. Implications.	38
(1) Anarchism.	39
(2) Pluralism.	40
(3) Right of sovereignty.	41
(a) State distinguished from other groups.	41
(b) Meaning of its sovereignty.	43
2. Purpose: the establishment of the objective conditions for the will to power.	44
a. A permanent order.	45
b. An available storehouse of acquired wisdom.	46
c. Justice.	47
3. The state and the church.	49
a. Value of religion to the state.	49
b. The desired relation between church and state.	50
IV. Art and Religion.	51
A. The value of art.	52
1. Scope for unexpressed powers.	52
a. Energies increased.	52
b. Ideal of beauty transferred to all life.	52
2. Art not sufficient: religion needed.	53
B. The "God-idea."	54
1. The whole-idea as God-idea.	54
a. Why a God-idea.	55

3	Provision for change in institutions
4	Can surviving force approximate to certainty
5	The state
6	Necessity for the state
7	Psychological basis: will-direction
8	Legislations
9	(1) Americanism
10	(2) Europeanism
11	(3) Right of sovereignty
12	(a) State distinguished from other groups
13	(b) Meaning of its sovereignty
14	Purpose: the establishment of the objective conditions
15	for the will to power
16	a. A permanent order
17	b. An available storehouse of acquired wisdom
18	c. Justice
19	The state and the church
20	a. Value of religion to the state
21	b. The desired relation between church and state
22	IV. Art and Religion
23	A. The value of art
24	1. Scope for unexpressed powers
25	a. Energies increased
26	b. Ideal of beauty transferred to all life
27	2. Art not sufficient: religion needed
28	B. The "God-idea"
29	1. The whole-idea as God-idea
30	a. Why a God-idea

b. The attributes of God.	56
c. The God-idea as chief determinant of value.	57
2. Union with God as the good.	57
a. Asceticism.	58
b. Worship and mysticism.	58
(1) The purpose of worship.	58
(2) Revelation.	60
(3) Inspiration.	61
(4) Prophetic consciousness.	61
c. Relation to the problem of evil.	62
C. Christianity.	64
1. Feeling versus behavior.	64
a. Value placed on love.	64
b. Transformation of instincts required.	65
(1) Pugnacity transformed to creative impulse.	65
(2) Ambition transformed to the passion for souls	66
2. Salvation: right valuing.	67
a. The human agency.	68
b. The Divine aggression.	68
CONCLUSION.	72
Summary.	75
Notes	79
Bibliography.	84

66	b. The attributes of God
67	c. The God-idea as chief determinant of values
67	2. Union with God as the good
68	a. Association
69	b. Worship and mysticism
70	(1) The purpose of worship
70	(2) Revelation
71	(3) Inspiration
71	(4) Prophetic consciousness
72	c. Relation to the problem of evil
74	3. Christianity
74	1. Feeling versus behavior
74	a. Values placed on love
75	b. Transformation of instincts required
75	(1) Instincts transformed to creative impulses
76	(2) Instincts transformed to the passion for souls
77	2. Salvation: right valuing
78	a. The human agency
78	b. The Divine agency
79	CONCLUSION
79	APPENDIX
79	Notes
84	Bibliography

INTRODUCTION.

A. Statement of the problem.

The subject of this thesis is the ethical theory of William E. Hocking, Alford professor of philosophy at Harvard University. He has written no text book on ethics and no book primarily devoted to ethical theory, except as his Human Nature and its Remaking approached that. Therefore the thesis material has been gathered from all of his writings as each was read in the search for his beliefs concerning moral value.

1. Its limits.

The thesis has been limited to a discussion of ethical or moral theory, and hence only that which directly pertains to a theory of value, or a study of the ideals which ought to be achieved in human life, or that which is necessary to the understanding of such theory is legitimate subject matter. Hocking's philosophy is both broad and deep. He has dealt with psychology, with political theory, with the philosophy of law, and with religion. There are many phases of interest to the reader in all these discussions, but we have attempted to avoid any detailed account of his views where those views are not relevant to the subject of the thesis. We have also tried to include all of the material which is necessary to its clear understanding. Therefore we have included much that is purely descriptive because it forms a basis for that which is normative. Furthermore, having found the theory itself, we have sought for and recorded in so far as we were able, its applications in the realms of the individual, society and the state. We have gathered here, then, what we have understood of Hocking's conception of value: the intrinsic values and the instrumental values; the

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supreme value and the relationship of others to it; the possibilities of and helps toward the achievement of these values; and the functions of individuals, society, the state, art, and religion in promoting these things that are worth while in life.

2. Its significance.

Any attempt to find the true values of life and hence establish a standard by which to discern good from evil in all the complexities of living is significant. At least any such attempt which is based on a careful, critical investigation of facts is significant, for to the extent that man finds truth and learns the ultimate goal of existence, to that extent can he eliminate waste effort, and work toward that which will ultimately count in the progress of the world.

But Hocking's contribution to ethical theory has other significance. First we might mention the wide range of his interest and study. The man whose investigations are almost exclusively in the realm of psychology, or biology, or sociology, or political theory, or religion, is likely to be biased by his own interest and assert a scheme of values which fits his own field, but will not fit all others. Hocking, however, covers all of these fields, and though his results suffer inevitably in lack of thoroughness, nevertheless he has achieved something of the synoptic view which is the philosopher's ideal. His ethical theory is the more significant because he has tried to see life as a whole and relate its various parts to a single, all-inclusive end.

Secondly, Hocking's theory is significant because of its idealism. In this age of emphasis on the practical and the mechanical, of doubt of the functions of mind and the will, the existence of the soul, and of God, the idealist seems to stand out

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B. Materials and Methods.

There are two chief sources of the material in this thesis: first, the writings of Hocking himself; and second, the reviews and criticisms of his work. Of Hocking's own books the one which most nearly presents a whole view of his ethical theory is his Human Nature and its Remaking,¹ but the others,² with the possible exception of Morale and its Enemies which is in a different class, having been written chiefly for the World War period,³ are also necessary and valuable to a full understanding of his beliefs along this line.¹ Of his magazine articles, a few are simply extracts or preliminary statements of the material in his books; some do not attempt to go very thoroughly into their subject and hence are worth while to us only as confirmation of his views expressed elsewhere. A few such as "The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Human Happiness"² are of real value to the study of his ethical theory.

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I. Human Nature: some facts basic to a theory of ethics.

In studying the ethical theory of any man, it is necessary to understand his fundamental psychological beliefs about human nature, for a conception of what ought to be is usually based in some way on a conception of what is. Hocking in his book Human Nature and its Remaking spends a great deal of time describing human nature as he sees it before dealing much with the normative question of its remaking in the light of certain standards or ideals. The method is well chosen. We shall follow the same plan.

A. Instincts.

It is difficult to distinguish original human nature from that nature which we know, modified as it is by environment. The existence of instincts, however, is generally attributed to man's heredity. The biologist sees in instincts a group of reflexes called forth by stimuli, and responding in regular order until certain conclusions are reached. A mechanism and its mode of operation are involved in each instinct, but this mechanism is subject, especially in human beings, to modification by experience. The modified instincts tend to the formation of habits. The psychologist notes that instincts increase the interest attached to objects of perception, and they prompt conduct accordingly, "giving zest, momentum, and assurance to that course of conduct." ⁵

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variety of lists of instincts offered by men who study these fields reveals the need of more accurate criteria for defining instincts. Hocking attributes the difficulty of determining the range of instinct to these three facts:

1. "The balance of instincts." They often offset each other to such an extent that they are inconspicuous or at least they can not be distinguished one from the other.⁶
2. "Variety of pattern." Each instinct does not have its own unique mode of expression. Several may find expression through the same physiological processes or may use different physical responses at different times.⁶
3. "Coalescence of instincts." The satisfaction of one instinct often brings with it the satisfaction of other related instincts.⁶

Recognizing these difficulties, Hocking outlines his own survey of instincts,⁷ dividing them into positive and negative types, and denoting the degree of generality, the units of behavior and other characteristics. The list need not concern us here except as we move on to his conception of central instincts.

2. Central instincts: necessary interests.

Curiosity is placed among the instincts,¹⁰ yet it,¹¹ unlike the others,¹² has no one class of objects which serve as its stimuli,¹³ neither does it have any definite type of response. The state of consciousness determines at any one moment what will arouse curiosity and what will satisfy it. There seem to be other tendencies which, like curiosity,¹⁴ are "central instincts",¹⁵ that is,¹⁶ they are not confined to specific stimulus-response mechanisms. They are "necessary interests" in that they do not depend on "specific routings of nervous energy",¹⁷ but on the nature of the

nervous system itself."⁸ Therefore they presumably serve needs which are common to all animals with nervous systems.

Besides curiosity, Hocking recognizes various necessary interests among the instincts which have frequently been rejected as such because of their difference from the definite stimulus-response type of instinct. For example, rhythm, self-preservation or the will-to-live, the will to power, and sociability seem to be necessary interests. "They are consequences of the fact that the stuff of which we are made works better in one way than in another."⁹

He is very vague in this discussion finding as much difficulty in defining which instincts are central as in determining what are instincts at all. He has been criticized by some reviewers for this,¹⁰ but he does offer an explanation. The general obscurity and vagueness in regard to the central instincts is due, he believes, to the fact that they cannot be separated from each other as distinct interests, but are interwoven into one fundamental instinct. It is necessary to determine what this inclusive central instinct is.

B. The will.

1. Definition.

Hocking defines the will as a ruling policy, a general principle which governs a life, controlling even instinctive impulses. His view is clear when he shows the relation of the will to the central instincts, and thus defines it more fully.

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It has already been proposed that the central instincts are

not distinct entities but are phases of one inclusive instinct. The interlocking of these necessary interests is clearly seen when one tries to attribute correct motives to men's acts. Motives are mixed. Hocking maintains that they are never entirely separate even in their origin,¹⁰ for each successive experience or act has its relation to and grows out of the self which embodies all previous experiences. Experience slowly builds up in the self a principle of choice,¹¹ a ruling policy based on those things which are satisfying to itself. "And to have a stable policy is to have, in the specific sense of the word,¹² a will." 11 Thus the will is the result of a development. A long series of choices lies back of the conscious formulation of any principle. The principle itself becomes more and more definitely outlined as time goes on.

"Will exists when,¹³ and in so far as,¹⁴ any instinctive impulse has first to obtain the consent of a ruling policy before pursuing its course. The policy of a self is its acquired interpretation of its own central and necessary interest." 12

b. A fundamental human will.

If we assume that there is a human nature,¹⁵ that is,¹⁶ that men are fundamentally alike,¹⁷ there should be, Hocking feels,¹⁸ some primary ruling policy, or will,¹⁹ which is common to all men. This most central of the central instincts has never been,²⁰ and probably never will be adequately expressed in any brief term. Yet,²¹ realizing this limitation,²² Hocking uses the phrase "will to power" to designate this fundamental "substance of the human will." 13 This idea of the will to power is so important to the whole ethical theory which we are studying that we must go more deeply into Hocking's conception of it.

2. The will to power.

Many of the simple instincts obviously involve a striving for power. Food-getting to a certain extent is a form of conquest, caused a feeling of mastery as well as of increased strength and self-control. Play provides practice in power, skill, control. Fear expresses negatively the will to power. The sex instinct, acquisitive instincts and others may be partly interpreted, at least, as a phase of this all-pervasive will to power. Hocking rejects the term will to live, though in some respects it is less likely to be misunderstood, because mere existence is not a strong enough appeal. Rather, one needs to say "the will to live as a man," ¹⁴ which involves active and creative qualities, or even better, use the term "will to power".

a. Relation to Nietzsche's "will to power."

Hocking admittedly uses here the phrase so characteristic of Nietzsche, and he hastens to clear his own conception of it from the mistakes of Nietzsche's view. Nietzsche's error, he claims, consisted in the supposition that the term was adequate, and also in the belief that power was competitive, something to be achieved at the expense of others. Hocking, on the contrary, calls attention to the fact that he has admitted the inadequacy of the term for expressing all that the central instinct really is. He has used it merely for lack of a better term, and because this particular form is most appropriate to the modern stage of civilization. Furthermore, he rejects the competitive implication, and insists that power-over must, in its highest form, become power-for. The will to power does not exclude a genuine love and service for mankind. ¹⁵

This brief discussion of the difference between the two theories of the will to power is quite unsatisfactory because too short. In the first place it may be doubted whether Nietzsche himself regarded the term as entirely adequate. At least he clearly recognized and emphasized the hypothetical character of the theory.¹⁶ And secondly, Nietzsche did recognize "power-for" as well as "power-over". That is, the truly strong man has power and to spare. He can afford to give to others and work for their benefit, whereas the selfish man is one who has energy enough only for his own purposes.¹⁷ However, it is true that Hocking eliminates as much as possible the competitive nature of the will to power. His end is not the production of a few supermen at considerable expense to the rest of mankind, but the opportunity for all men to develop those powers that have been given them with no injustice to others, as we shall see later. In this respect he does satisfy his claim of advance over Nietzsche's view.

b. Definition and Function.

Perhaps the best definition of the will to power,¹⁸ as conceived by Hocking, is found in Man and the State: "The will to live, in man,¹⁹ takes the form of the will to power, i.e.,²⁰ the will to be in conscious knowing control of such energies as the universe has, and to work with them in reshaping that universe."¹⁸ The typical development of this will to power transforms it from early self-assertive expression through various stages to the final form of power through ideas. This becomes power for the benefit of others because ideas are in the realm where they must be shared.¹⁹ But what is the function of this will to power? If it is the central instinct of all human life how does it

guide life to the attainment of its values?

The will to power is the chief agency in the "remaking" of human nature, that is, the process of transforming all the specific instincts into a unified purpose. The peculiar characteristic of man is his development of character, his self-changing and self-organizing, his remaking process; and only a will can truly transform a will. But it is not the only agency.

c. Cooperation with outer factors in experience.

The will must have something with which to work. It finds its material in external situations and, cooperating with them, forms experience, which Hocking defines as just this working together of inner and outer agents of change. He distinguishes two types of experience: that which is called training because it involves deliberate suggestion; and that which is not training, which comes freely and naturally to the individual, either when alone or in society. Hocking concerns himself here with the latter type.

The will to power finds its task in transforming the instincts so that they meet and fit particular circumstances. In the human being the instincts are even more general than in the lower animals. They have a wider range of response. This makes it possible for the will to power to subordinate them to its own control and thus guide their responses toward the promotion of its ends. This organization in relation to the central instinct tends toward the fixing of habits, which are the best found methods of response.

d. Determination of the "mental-after-image."

Experience, that is, the cooperation of the will with external situations has two chief tools by which it molds the individual: pleasure and pain. The effect of each of these depends in

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human nature, that is, the process of transforming all the

other instincts into a unified purpose. The regular charac-

teristic of man is his development of character, his self-charac-

teristic and self-organizing, his forming process; and only a will

can truly transform a will, that is not the only agency.

c. Cooperation with outer factors in experience.

The will must have something with which to work, it finds its

material in external situations and, cooperating with them, forms

experience, which Hacking defines as just this working together

of inner and outer agents of change. He distinguishes two types

of experience: that which is called training because it involves

deliberate suggestion; and that which is not training, which

comes freely and naturally to the individual, either when alone

or in society. Hacking concerns himself here with the latter type.

The will to power finds its task in transforming the instincts

so that they meet and fit particular circumstances. In the human

being the instincts are even more general than in the lower ani-

mals. They have a wider range of responses. This makes it possible

for the will to power to subordinate them to its own control and

thus guide their responses toward the promotion of its ends. This

organization in relation to the control instinct tends toward

the fixing of habits, which are the best found methods of response

d. Determination of the "mental-after-image."

Experience, that is, the cooperation of the will with exter-

nal situations has two chief facts by which it molds the indivi-

dual: pleasure and pain. The effect of each of these depends in

part on the mind which records them. Pain, for example, teaches human beings to discriminate, to think. There are pleasures and pains which are definite sensations. These need merely to be noted and either sought or avoided in the future according to their nature. There are others which cause a general feeling of depression or elation. The mind studies the causes and effects of these and learns to control behavior accordingly. But often in more complex experiences, conduct must be guided by the "mental-after-image." One's own mental reaction (distinguished from Nature's physical reaction) to a situation or an activity is the final judge of its worth. This mental-after-image may be entirely at variance with the physical pleasure or pain involved in the experience. It is the will to power, the whole will, which determines this after-image when it sees the results of the action of the partial impulse in the light of its total purpose.²⁰

e. The dialectic of the will.

The effectiveness of the will to power in thus controlling instincts is illustrated by Hocking in a sketch of the changes which pugnacity undergoes. This work of experience he calls the dialectic of the will. In its original form pugnacity aims for the destruction of its opponent. But the total will comes to desire the evidence of its victim's suffering, and a recognition of defeat. Therefore the instinct is transformed to revenge, and this takes place apart from any social restraint or suggestion. But even revenge does not satisfy, for, especially where there are many individuals, the permanent maintenance of hatred is difficult and harmful. The third stage in the interpretation of pugnacity is thus reached: punishment. Punishment causes pain but

only temporarily, and it distinguishes between an evil element of will and the whole will. When once this distinction has been made, it is a comparatively short step, Hocking believes, to the fourth aim of pugnacity. Effort will be directed not so much toward the destruction or punishment of the evil element, as toward the restoration of the good of the whole. The result is a "complete suppression of the destructive behavior in the interest of a resolute kindliness." 21

Hocking's claim throughout this discussion is that experience would be likely to produce these transformations apart from "training", the deliberate correction of society, or even of religion, because the will increasingly learns what best satisfies it as a whole. He does not deny, however, the influence and great help of all phases of society in this process. His contention is that the will is a very real factor in itself. It is not a product of custom and social training, entirely. It is a factor in the molding of these. Human nature has an original direction which society can modify but cannot distort.

This dialect of the will is essential not only to Hocking's theory of the will but also to his ethical theory for many of the values of human character depend on such a transformation of instincts. He has placed conduct not on a basis of physiological mechanisms but on a basis of moral choice by a will which has unified all the impulses of life under a ruling principle. This principle is that which has been found by its experience to be the best. It is the only basis for rational choice.

3. "Will-circuits."

There is another phase of Hocking's theory of the will which should be discussed, especially because of its relation to his view of the state. He speaks of "vital circuits" or, chiefly, "will-circuits." What is his meaning in the use of these terms?

a. Definition.

No human being is sufficient unto himself. Its various instincts reach out and involve other objects, as, for example, the food-getting instinct needs its physical objects, its territory for action, etc. These external objects become extensions of the self and will, parts of the greater self, in some such way as a limb is part of the body. The limb is held by vital circuits of nutrition. The external objects are held to the self by vital circuits of the will, or by "will-circuits."²² The will-circuit then is an extension of the self formed as its will and its habits include within their activity objects external to the self.

b. Relation to the State.

There may be a will-circuit of a group as well as of an individual. Objects which are shared by the group, including the human relationships of the members themselves, form a common will-circuit. This grows more and more important as the group grows larger for the identity of interests increases. The will-circuit takes on the appearance of a distinct entity and the individual feels more and more his obligation to contribute his share to the group life. Hocking believes that the will-circuit of the group is so strong that it demands the State as its organ. We examine this interesting theory more closely, finding out first why he

rejects other forces as the reason for the State's existence.

(1) Sociability and economic forces insufficient.

Sociability certainly underlies the State as it does other social groups but in itself it is not strong enough to form the State. Simple sociability draws people together; increases the normal flow of ideas and thus raises the level of values in the group. Yet sociability can also be divisive. That is, there are distinct tendencies toward the small group which are divisive in relation to the large group. Sociability is thus a variable force. After all, in itself, it can create only the crowd. It must be combined with other forces to do more than just bring people together. "It is headless: it can neither be nor outline a social unity." 23

The prominence of economic forces in recent years has brought forth the question whether they are ~~not~~ sufficient as the cause of the state's existence. Hocking of course admits their power but points out their essential tendency toward division rather than unity. In its direct form, for example in hunger, economic interest is self-assertive and hence divisive. In a more advanced form it is cooperative as there develops division of labor and the consequent formation of groups. But this cooperative aspect is simply the basis for rivalry on a larger scale. Economic interest, in itself, forms competitive groups, not the necessary unity of the state.

If neither sociability nor economic force is sufficient alone, the two combined might be adequate for the formation of the state. But no, the divisive forces are still stronger than the unifying forces. As society develops, desires are increased and self-assertive tendencies become stronger. At the same time standards are

more vague, and are likely to be lower in the large group, so that they fail to check sufficiently the self-assertion which brings division and competition.

The state is not based primarily on ^{specific} instincts at all. There is certainly no state-building instinct, and combinations of other instincts are not peculiar to the state or are so subject to modification by environment that they lack the stability necessary for the organization of a political unity. Hocking turns to the will for the psychological basis of the state.

(2) The state as will-circuit.

We have already discussed Hocking's understanding of the will. This ruling policy in the individual is interested in more than itself. It has an interest in and assumes some responsibility for the group of which it is a member. Notice, Hocking says, a gang of boys. Each feels himself competent to rule its affairs. This "overflow" of the will tends toward the state. "The will to power in the form of the disposition to administer is the psychological origin of the state." 24

This assertion is based on the theory of will-circuits. As vital circuits tend to be established by the major instincts, so the will to power, the fundamental instinct of man, must have its circuit, its physical objects, its region of activity, its sources of supply. "The state is the circuit required by the will to power of each member, coincident for all the people of a defined territory, and including them." 25 The state is the most inclusive of all the groups within society. Hence the wills to power find their total circuit in it.

If the will-circuit is the psychological basis for the state

it is evident why nations are formed rather than a universal state. A circuit is limited in its possible range. It develops within certain geographic areas, has a comparatively limited time-span and revolves around activities which cumulate as history unique unto itself. The will-circuit also explains why the state is not optional. One cannot become a member or drop one's membership at will, at least not in the State in general, though one might in any particular state. More of this under a later section (III, B). Furthermore the genuine unity in the wills of citizens is explained without recourse to any "mystical corporate personality,"²⁶ or other binding force. The unity is more than a mere idea or principle; it is an actual coincidence of the wills to power, as each reaches out into regions common to others. It is a unity which places the responsibility of group action on every member. Hocking rejects the conception of a "group mind" for the following reasons: first, the inability to attach responsibility to anything or anyone but the members themselves; second, the ease with which groups are formed and broken; and third, the instability of groups under changing leadership.²⁷ There is no separate entity to which value attached apart from the members themselves.

Such is the theory. Its implications are seen under the section devoted to the state. Criticism is reserved until then.

C. Conscience.

So far, Hocking, in his study of human nature, has found it composed of instincts, both specific and central. These are all organized around and subordinated to the will or the will to power, the fundamental instinct of mankind. The social expression of this will to power is in will-circuits, of which the state is the most complete representative. But in the political life which thus originates, man's chief interest seems to be in justice, in establishing principles of right and wrong which are embodied in its laws. Is this too a part of original human nature? Is there a native moral instinct, a conscience?

1. Obligation as socially developed.

Social obligation, "you-ought", does not need a native instinct as a foundation. Custom builds up certain ways of conducting one's self. The individual who fails to conform not only suffers the pain of disapproval but runs the risk of greater menace. This strong preference for certain types of behavior could easily develop into a sense of obligation and an insistence that the individual "ought" to conform and do thus and so. But this socially developed conscience is not the same as the conscience of which we usually speak.

2. Obligation as a unique experience.

In response to the "you-ought" of society there is an "I-ought" of the individual, otherwise the sense of obligation loses its meaning and becomes merely a request or demand. The child at first hears and acts according to what others say is its obligation, but this in time awakens in him his own moral sense, an "I-ought"

which is unique, expressible in no other terms. It is very different from the feeling that it is expedient to do this because others desire it. If it were not so, it would be impossible for an individual to rise above the moral ideal of society.²⁸

"The social use of the word . . . appeals to a strand of self-judgment which is original with every individual, and in this sense belongs to original human nature."²⁹

But can it be called instinctive?

3. Relation to instinct.

Hocking seems to be certain that conscience cannot be classed as instinct,³⁰ yet his statement of the position which it holds is not very well defined. It is the chief factor in the remaking of human nature; therefore it must stand over against all the instincts and judge them. Is it then the whole will to power which has been seen to do something of the same thing,³¹ or is it separate and unique like self-consciousness? Hocking's view, as he states it, is that

"conscience stands outside the instinctive life of man, not as something separate, but as an awareness of the success or failure of that life in maintaining its status and its growth."³⁰

That is, conscience is an insistence on the agreement of the expression of the instincts with the policy of the total will to power. His further interpretation he takes up in a negative way under sin.

It is easier to explain conscience psychologically than physiologically. It is still easier to be sure of its existence than to explain it even psychologically. Hocking has at least found conscience as a rational will acting consistently and seeking to promote that which seems best to satisfy its needs. He could hardly have made it more significant.

II. Fundamental theory of value.

It is difficult to work out a theory of value,³⁰ partly because we discover that we do not know what we truly desire,³¹ partly because many of the things which we desire conflict with each other. But there seems to be one persistent, though not universal demand to which a theory should conform,³² and that is that whatever the conditions for achieving value, it should be possible for every individual to meet them.³²

A. Satisfaction of the whole self.

First of all, Hocking is sure that whatever is truly valuable will satisfy the whole self,³³ and not merely one or more fragments of the self. That it is impossible to satisfy each separate desire is obvious, for they constantly conflict. Separate desires are subordinate to the whole self and its need. Hocking has expressed this fact in his address on the "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Human Happiness." He points out there the two aspects of the self: the "excursive" or active self,³⁴ and the "reflective" self. The first necessary condition for happiness is a normal relationship between these two phases of ourselves. "To cram ourselves wholly into every act of expression is the first and sufficient principle of happiness."³⁵

Stoicism is not the true theory of value because it emphasizes the reflective self and neglects the excursive. An extreme altruism such that I find happiness not through any of my own successful achievements but entirely through the success of God,³⁶ or the race,³⁷ or some principle,³⁸ that is, "vicarious happiness",³⁹ is not final either,⁴⁰ for it fails to give a motive for whole-souled

effort and tends too much toward resignation. It also fails to satisfy the excursive self. Happiness is not simply an inner state achieved regardless of activities. We must be able to know and bend our efforts toward or cooperate with that which is Real in order to satisfy the whole self.³⁴

1. Discipline versus Liberation.

But if we are to satisfy the whole self as over against all the various desires that arise within us, what is to happen to those which are not satisfied, and what is to become of our freedom, the freedom to assert our impulses? Hocking has two very interesting short chapters on the problem of discipline and freedom in his Human Nature and its Remaking. In tracing the development of Rousseau's theory, he points out the growth of a disciplinarian view from the original one of liberation. So with Hegel, and so with others. Some instincts and desires have to be controlled by other instincts and desires. Nietzsche granted freedom to the powerful elements of human nature and in doing so had to subordinate other elements sternly. Satisfaction for some tendencies of life "means organizing the whole life on their own principle."³⁵ The present movement of expressionism, Hocking feels, is beginning to draw the same conclusions, and must eventually do so, for the man who is simply a bundle of single desires is not so much free in expressing them as he is controlled by them. He has no unity, no purpose. Even the Freudians have shifted their emphasis from the evil of repression to the necessity of sublimation.³⁶ True freedom belongs to the man who is in control of his desires. Liberation involves discipline.

2. An independent standard.

It has been said that a true value must satisfy the entire self, and that this necessarily involves the subordination of some desires to others,³⁶ a freedom in controlling and in transforming desires rather than a freedom of undisciplined assertion of desires. But what standard will be the guide in this relating of desires so as to unify the self as a whole? Hocking thinks that it must be "an independent standard", that is,³⁶ something involving the outer objects of value rather than the inner instincts or desires of the valuer. A theory of value is

"likely to find itself dealing with an ultimate court which gives laws to nature,³⁷ rather than receiving laws from nature."³⁷

B. Value and the "whole-idea."

We have seen Hocking's skepticism of any theory of value based on instincts,³⁸ desires or feelings,³⁹ with its dangerous tendency toward liberation. To him thought or idea is more important in any question of morality; for thought can encompass the whole self,⁴⁰ can relate its various parts and can search for that independent standard which determines values. This is a most important part of his theory of ethics.

1. Idea basic in morals.

Hocking recognizes the tendency in biology,⁴¹ psychology,⁴² and pragmatism to neglect if not discard the intellect,⁴³ in favor of instincts and emotions which seem to be in control even over reason, in many instances. Especially has this been true in relation to religion. Its inner personal characteristics and intangible objects of worship have caused this. His meeting of

the tendency has not been to reverse the process and discard feeling in favor of idea, at least not entirely; but to link the two. His thesis is "that there is no such thing as feeling apart from idea; that idea is an integral part of all feeling." ³⁸ Knowledge is the goal of feeling. Ideas are necessary, usually, to communicate feeling from person to person. Feelings are distinguished as religious or otherwise by their objects and accompanying ideas. The idea is a permanent thing, the feeling a transient. Some seek to separate the two in an ideal of a theoretical use of idea free from feeling biases, but this can be attained only partially. Some feeling must necessarily be involved, to a small extent at least.

Since, therefore, Hocking conceives idea or thought as fundamental, his theory of value is based on and determined by idea (or, more properly, idea-feeling), and what satisfies it, rather than on the purely instinctive or emotional phases of life. Thus in the realm of morals, a person has already made the "longest step" toward any certain value when he has gained the idea of the virtue, cleanliness, or good-will, for example. ³⁹ This same viewpoint is shown in his book on Morale and its Enemies. There he points out the necessity on the soldier's part of a steadfast belief in his task, to back up the instincts and feelings which play their part in morale. ⁴⁰

Hocking's idealism here is very pronounced. Thought or mind is the substance of the universe. Macintosh has given a very critical review of his Absolute idealism. ⁴¹ The scope of this thesis does not include such a discussion. Naturally however a theory of reality based on mind as over against matter makes an intelligent will possible, makes choice and hence ethics possible, and raises the level of the values.

2. The idea of reality: the "whole-idea"

But Hocking's use of "idea" needs to be clarified. It is no single idea of which he is speaking. He has placed intellect,³⁹ the thought-world,⁴⁰ above the instinctive and emotional worlds in importance. Moreover,⁴¹ he has contributed the theory of a "whole-idea" or idea of reality, an important characteristic of and determinant of values in every individual.

Hocking claims that every idea which is born in a human mind finds its place in and becomes a part of one all-inclusive view of the whole,⁴² an outlook on the world. From the very first one has an idea of the whole, simple as it may be. This "whole-idea" of course is modified constantly by new ideas, yet its permanent existence can be affirmed throughout all variations just as there is one fundamental food-idea in mankind through the food substances vary everywhere.

This whole-idea is really one's idea of reality. There is in the human mind an interest in reality per se,⁴³ and every idea is connected in its ultimate meaning with the idea of reality which one holds. The conception of the closeness of this relationship of ideas may be seen in this statement:

"Ideas . . . are not what we think of,⁴⁴ they are what we think with. Now whatever else the unity of consciousness may mean,⁴⁵ it also means that there is no isolated action of ideas,⁴⁶ but that I think with all of them at once in each moment,⁴⁷ though the 'bearing' of any given idea upon any given experience may be very remote." 42

Too remote to be certain of, one might comment. It is interesting to note,⁴⁸ though it has little direct bearing on our subject,⁴⁹ that Hocking here and elsewhere denies sub-consciousness in the usual sense of the word. Every idea however dim plays its part through the whole-idea, in every action,⁵⁰ according to him. There is no danger then from a dominant sub-conscious self which interferes

with the work of the will.

a. Determinant of values.

It is this whole-idea which determines how a person looks at things,³⁹ and what values they have for him. Our attitudes to some extent give value to objects,⁴⁰ value which changes as our moods change or as we get a truer perspective. Our idea of reality sets the ends for which our actions and feelings should strive.

"All valuing (and so all feeling) is a way of knowing objects with one's whole-idea An object of value is an object in which my whole-idea finds some peculiar ease and sufficiency of application." ⁴³

In Man and the State the same thought is expressed in an interesting way: "An individual is a unique perception of value,⁴¹ at work in judging experience." ⁴⁴

This is a splendid example of a synoptic view of value. Empirical values are criticized in relation to each other and systematized in the light of the whole. It is the only way to avoid inconsistency and is the only justified basis on which to make a choice when there is a conflict of values. ⁴⁵

b. The real as the good.

If the whole-idea determines what values are to any man,⁴² it is very important what kind of a whole-idea one has. For example it makes a great deal of difference whether one judges the whole as good or evil. If one's idea of reality is that the real is good,⁴³ one's whole system of values will be on a higher level than that of a view which sees reality as evil. Reality is that independent standard spoken of above (II, A, 2) and Hocking asserts that the Real is good,⁴⁴ that evil can be conquered and

is therefore not on the same plane of reality with that which opposes it. To the extent that one's idea of the whole approaches Reality itself, to that extent one's values will be true or ideal values.

c. Transition to the God-idea.

As has been said, everyone has his whole-idea, but there are great differences in conceptions about the whole. It is religion's task to put a divine interpretation on the whole and thus effect the transition from the whole-idea to what Hocking calls the God-idea. The validity of this divine interpretation of reality, and its effect on ethical theory is reserved for discussion in a later section under the heading of religion.

d. Disvalue: Sin.

In the meantime we need to touch on another phase of Hocking's theory of value, namely, the negation of value, or sin.

The conception of sin is in some disrepute just now but Hocking sees no justification in doing away with it. There are three current fallacies regarding sin which he points out; the fallacy of cancelling sin by overbalancing it with merit; the fallacy of custom, the universality of sin dulling the sensitiveness toward it; and the fallacy of asserting primitive impulses as natural and therefore right. Consciousness cannot entirely do away with the sense of sin even by cancellation, for it is aware, however dimly, of an inconsistency in the policy of the self. Sin is the deliberate refusal to act on an impulse according to the best interests or the central instinct, the will to power. Or, in the light of his theory of the whole-idea, we suppose sin would be defined as a refusal to take into account the ultimate

meaning of an act in the light of one's idea of reality.

1. Sin as deed.

There are two types of sin: that which is evident in specific deeds, and that which may be called a status. Sinful deeds are those such as are described in the foregoing discussion. Sin may be thought of as blindness, a shutting of one's eyes to the wider reaches of knowledge. Sin is an individual affair. The only reason that society can say that such and such things are sinful, is that some kinds of behavior are so far below the level of the average interpretation of the will to power that they can be assumed to contradict the individual's conscience.

Sin may also be thought of as untruth for it is false to the unspoken implication of one's actions. Society assumes that the individual acts according to his best knowledge. When he does not he is false to that expectation. He is living an untruth, committing a sin.⁴⁶

2. Sin as status.

Hocking's view of sin does not permit the old conception of original sin, but he does recognize a state of sin apart from specific deeds. That is, a person's moral status would be his character, his standards of choices. In case anyone reached the place where he did not prefer the good at the cost of moral effort he would have reached the status of sin. It is a common experience to be conscious of many previous failures to live up to one's best. Each deliberate choice for what is less than the best adds something to the status of sin. The significance of this status cannot be asserted dogmatically. Hocking feels that it involves somehow a loss of immortality, but he is not clear

meaning of an act in the light of one's idea of reality.

I, with a doubt.

There are two types of aim: that which is evident in specific deeds, and that which may be called a subconscious, spiritual aim. The latter such as are described in the foregoing discussion, may be thought of as a kind of aim, a kind of aim to the wider reaches of knowledge, aim in an individual effort. The only reason that society can say that such and such things are right, is that some kind of behavior are as far below the level of the average intelligence of the aim to power that they can be assumed to contradict the individual's conscience. It may be thought of as a kind of aim, a kind of aim to the unspoken legislation of one's motive. Society assumes that the individual acts according to his best knowledge, when he does not he is less so than expected, he is living an un-
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to just what extent. He finds it reasonable that sin should be a matter of deep concern to mankind, for inevitably man seeks the good in life and is restless when conscious of any exclusion from that good. His will to power is ultimately a will to overcome death, and religion has made him sensitive to that which may thwart this will.

3. Cause: Existence of moral dilemmas.

Sin is an evidence of freedom and therefore there can be no cause of sin in the sense that sin necessarily results from certain sequences of action or thought. But nevertheless Hocking explains the possibility of sin by the existence of moral dilemmas which make wrong choices very easy.

Right effort involves deliberation yet deliberation can never be complete. One may come to a decision too soon and thus sin, or too late and lose the chance for right action. A second dilemma concerns association with others. A moral life involves social contact, yet all such contact is with imperfect and sinful persons or parties, or institutions. A third dilemma arises in connection with the moral authority of society. The authority of the leader or of the group is inevitable and necessary, yet it is also necessary to maintain one's power of individual moral choice. It is difficult to keep the balance between these two. Hocking sees a fourth dilemma in the fighting for one's conviction of right. The danger of arousing purely personal hostility is great, yet it is wrong to let a moral issue remain unchallenged just for fear of going too far in one's opposition.

The fifth dilemma sums up all the others.⁴⁷ There must be a considerable risk of wrong-doing involved in the attempt to do right. This is moral adventure. But it is the total will

toward good which counts. If this is strong, occasional sins do sometimes add to its strength by the remorse which they cause.

1. Four postulates of a good society.

In general, society, or the group which it sets up, aids the individual in his development. It eliminates many of the difficulties of learning by experience; it guides development into a common direction, and maintains a minimum level of individual attainment. It not only facilitates the individual's own development but also to it. It increases the complexity and length of the preliminary to the satisfaction of any instinct. This strengthens self-control, enables the individual to live in a more complex environment, and enlarges the meaning of the whole process. It also sets a limit to the range of objects to which any one individual may attend. The greater the civilization the more selective a man becomes, and the smaller is the range, proportionately of his objects. This is a normal direction of individual development.

Yet society has also been repressive. It has forced individuals to conform to its own interests rather than conforming to theirs. It offers only limited opportunity to the individual because there is such competition in the use of material equipment; and it hinders individual expression by its fixation of customary behavior. These repressive

III. Evaluation of society and the state.

With this understanding of Hocking's psychology and his theory of value as it relates in particular to the individual, we may turn to his theories of society and the state, and later to art and religion. We wish to learn what values he finds in these, what standards he has for judging them and what ideals he thinks they should strive to realize.

A. Four postulates of a good society.

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Yet society has also been repressive. It has forced individuals to conform to its own interests rather than conforming to theirs; it offers only limited opportunity to the individual because there is such competition in the use of material equipment; and it hinders individual expression by its fixities of customary behavior.⁴⁹ These repressive

aspects of society ought to be corrected in so far as possible. Hocking sets up as his norm for society, ~~the~~ individual life with its natural tendency to transform itself as discussed under the dialectic of the will (p.12). With this as a standard he states four postulates of a good society.

1. Identity of social will with individual will.

The first postulate with which a good society must comply is that:

"What others wish me to be must be identical with what I myself wish to be." 50

Man's primary right is to his own development. Society, made up of individuals, must foster the development of its members. It has no right to use a person merely as means to its ends.

a. Helps toward achievement of this ideal.

No society has achieved this ideal, yet there are some existing conditions which help this identity of the social and the individual will. The fact that the first influence of society on the individual comes through the family and friends who are most interested in his personal growth is such a help. In the second place, the emergence of leaders - seers, prophets, priests and scholars - "recommenders" of ideals, has aided society in setting up standards which are just to the individual. These achieve, as much as is humanly possible, the essential disinterestedness which makes possible the choosing of ideals which are fair to both the individual and to society. Yet the danger of too great abstraction of ideals arises, and here again men have found a natural way out of the difficulty. Abstraction in one extreme calls forth abstraction

in an opposite extreme, and the individual must choose between them. This offsets the tendency to blind following of authority.

Another factor which aids the identity of the ideals of society with those of the individual is admiration, which prompts the individual to seek for himself those things which he admires in others. Society points out to him what he really wants. This is the chief function of education in Hocking's view. It hastens the development of the will by exposing the instincts to the right stimuli. The process of arousing the will through education inevitably tends to produce a type, and there is the danger of refuting this first postulate. But education also strives to stimulate growth beyond the type and draw out individuality.⁵¹

b. Its insufficiency.

But it is impossible for a great number of individuals, each seeking self-development, to live together without making some adjustments. There is not room enough for the full development of each. This ideal alone, then, is insufficient. To it must be added a second which shall provide a standard by which the justice of social relationships can be tested.

2. Subordination of competitive to non-competitive interests.

We have to give up something in order to have the advantage of social life. Many have over-estimated this loss, Hocking feels, for often the laws of society which seemingly

repress the individual's instincts, really express the truest interpretation of those instincts, the interpretation which the natural dialectic of the will would of itself work out. Yet to insure the freest possible social existence, a good society should comply with this second postulate:

"Every competitive interest must be so transformed or interpreted as to be non-competitive, or an ingredient in a non-competitive interest." 52

This does not mean the abolition of competition, for a certain amount of it is inevitable and desirable to stimulate social advance.

a. Possibility of attainment of this ideal.

There are some needs which always will be competitive. Such are the fundamental economic needs for there is a limit to the supply of materials required for their satisfaction. Others, those which Hocking has called the necessary interests, are non-competitive. Whatever is created in the realm of rhythm or order, art or idea, thereby enriches all. It is necessary then to ensure the subordination of the competitive to the non-competitive interests as the will to power deals with them both. Can the will to power be primarily non-competitive?

Power itself seems competitive, yet any power over others must be considerate of their welfare, for it depends on their strength. It is in the growth of this power that it is discovered that he who is to be most sure of his control over others must secure it by their free consent. In other words he must gain his power by serving them rather than by competing with them. And his power if it is to be unlimited must be

in the realm of idea, rather than in the competitive fields. Thus the will to power may become non-competitive,

b. Necessity of the state for its realization.

Yet in order that all competitive interests shall be subordinated to non-competitive interests there is necessary some more inclusive force than any will to power of an individual or even of groups of individuals. The state is necessary for the realization of this second postulate. For the state, as we have already seen ⁱⁿ Hocking's view, is the necessary outcome of the will-circuits of men. "The state is the objective condition through which a non-competitive satisfaction of the will to power becomes possible." ⁵³ The state is necessary, though not sufficient. But the discussion of the state must come later. We simply note here that unorganized society is not adequate in meeting the requirements which Hocking sets up as its ideals.

3. Provision for change in institutions.

Ideals, laws, and customs within society are embodied in institutions. Thus institutions preserve values for society and guide the individual as he seeks the meaning of his life. Yet they have not always been of such service, nor are they today, for too often they preserve custom beyond the time of its usefulness and so bring social difficulties. Man is adapted to hardship and grows strong in overcoming difficulties, but there is no need in preserving evil just for this purpose. There is enough without our efforts to produce it.

Just as the adult is more highly sensitive than a child

to pain and wrong, though he has greater self-control, so, as civilization advances, men become more sensitive to evil, and the old physical pains become social wrongs. The need constantly arises to change customs, laws and ideals. Therefore a third postulate for a good society is that:

"Whatever in institutions tends at any time to deform human nature shall be freely subject to the force of dissatisfaction naturally directed to change them." 54

The conserving forces of society shall not be so impervious to change that they become the preservers of that which is now evil. The world now is perhaps more ready to change than ever before when new knowledge comes assuring that the proposed reforms will truly reform.

4. Conserving force proportionate to certainty.

It is readily recognized that a good society must be ready to change its institutions in the light of new and advanced ideals. Yet, as Hocking points out, it is a serious thing to change them too hastily for they render a great service in conserving the experience of the race. Therefore a good society must comply with this fourth postulate:

"Conserving force shall be proportionate to certainty." 55

The institution must be willing to change easily only those ideals or laws of whose permanent value it is not certain, and must hold fast to the values of which it is assured.

These four postulates, it may be noticed, are in two pairs, the first two offsetting each other and the dangers which might arise from compliance with either one of them alone; and so with the last two. Obviously they are ideals to which society

ought to conform, and not statements of actual conditions. They are hardly recognized by actual societies as yet. Nevertheless there are observable tendencies in these directions, and the ideals are based, as Hocking's own theory would maintain, on what experience has pointed out to be best.

group, and that which develops the principles by which the group may live successfully together. In the political realm these two phases are seen in history and law respectively. In the psychological realm the two might be referred to will and judgment. As the group's life is extended it tends to become more and more stable because of the accumulated results of many past processes. The stability of environment thus developed is, primarily, the state.

1. Necessity for the State.

In searching for the values which the state has to offer or ought to offer, one is interested in knowing whether or not there is a necessity for the state's existence. The necessity gives greater significance to the worth of any object. Hocking sees the state as a necessary, and inevitable grouping.

a. Psychological Basis: Will-Directions.

We have already seen that Hocking finds the necessity for the state in man's conscious purposes, his will. As Hocking found the state established on a "system of moral order," so Hocking sees the will as power in the social world. The will is made over the world by understanding, directing and using the forces in the world. The social expression of will to power, the will-direction, is the psychological foundation

B.II The State.

Hocking names that process in society which draws together and forms a group the "commotive process".⁵⁶ There are two phases of this process, that which promotes the activity of the group, and that which develops the principles by which the group may live successfully together. In the political realm these two phases are seen in history and law respectively.⁵⁷ In the psychological realm the two might be referred to will and judgment. As the group's life is extended it tends to become more and more stable because of the accumulated results of these two processes. The stability of environment thus developed is, primarily, the state.

1. Necessity for the State.

In searching for the values which the state has to offer or ought to offer, one is interested in knowing whether or not there is a necessity for the state's existence, for necessity gives greater significance to the worth of any object. Hocking sees the state as a necessary, and inevitable grouping.

a. Psychological basis: will-circuits.

We have already seen that Hocking finds the necessity for the state in man's conscious purpose, his will. As Hobbes found the state established on a "pursuit of power after power,"⁵⁸ so Hocking sees the will to power as the basis; that is, the will to make over the world by understanding, directing and using the forces in the world.⁵⁸ The social expression of this will to power, the will-circuit, is the psychological foundation

of the state.⁵⁹

The will demands some things for its complete satisfaction which the individual cannot provide. He can gain self-control, maintain those contacts which are necessary and helpful, keep his ambition awake, and learn to discern readily new truths and values. But there are some requisites which can be supplied only by something other than the individual. For instance, the work of the individual must have a permanent influence, and that the individual cannot secure. Also the individual cannot supply himself by his own efforts with adequate knowledge for understanding either himself or his surroundings. The vast accumulations of learning of all kinds are made accessible to the seeker by something more inclusive and more permanent than any individual can supply. And finally, for the advance of the will to power there must be freedom from catastrophe and less due to disturbed conditions of any kind; there must be insured a state of justice where no unreasonable fortune or misfortune will hinder the opportunities for success. Obviously the individual can not furnish such security for himself. The state exists to supply these conditions. We shall consider these various functions of the state a little later under its purpose.

b. Implications.

In the meantime there are certain implications in the assertion of the state's necessity that need to be faced. It implies, for example, that the anarchists and pluralists are wrong. It implies also that the state has a unique place

among the social groups. Hocking considers each of these.

(1) Anarchism.

There are people who deny outright the necessity of the state. The philosophical anarchists have the following reasons for their view, as Hocking understands them. In the first place they have faith in man's ability to live without the state, faith in his fundamental tendency to cooperate with his fellow-men and treat them with enough fairness and good will to preserve order without an over-ruling government. Furthermore the state has restrained the liberty of men, and freedom is one of the primary values in the estimation of an anarchist. No other grouping in society makes such absolute demands on its membership as does the state. Again, the state, in its laws, prescribes what is good and thus takes away from individuals a large element of choice which has distinct moral value. The state thus tends to weaken the moral fibre of man, claim the anarchists. Finally, the state has abused its power - a criticism which is readily granted by all but which does not necessarily call forth the deduction which the anarchists draw from it.

Hocking has answered the anarchists chiefly by affirming the impossibility of their view. His claim, as we have seen, is that the state is a necessary outcome of the overflow of the wills to power of men, a reality essentially implied in their will-circuits. Therefore all criticisms which the anarchists raise are really applied only to particular states and not to the State per se, in spite of all their statements to the

contrary. The ~~existence~~ of the State is willed by every man.⁶⁰

He seems dogmatic as he so emphatically and shortly denies the possibility of the anarchists' position. He has been criticized both by those who agree with him fairly well and by his opponents.⁶¹ Buchanan accuses him of timidity and hesitancy in replying to the arguments of the anarchists, and furthermore of idealizing the state.⁶² That he has idealized the state is certainly true. With the states of today so under fire of criticism the arguments of the anarchists and others should have received more attention.

(2) Pluralism.

Besides the anarchists and their denial of the necessity of the state, there are the political pluralists who admit the state's existence but are not willing to grant to it the uniquely powerful position it holds. They deny its right of sovereignty. Society is divided into many groups; why should the state be the most inclusive one? Why should any one group dominate over the others?

Hocking has found the political pluralists inconsistent in their position. For example, though they complain of the state's sovereignty they have not actively proposed to give up its unique power, or its practical monopoly of force. Moreover, in their attempt to deny the state's right of sovereignty, they have pointed to the very evident influence on the state, and even control of it, exerted by some supposedly subordinate group such as economic organizations. In reality, then, they are complaining that the state is not sovereign enough, rather than that it is too much so. For if it is undesirable for the

state to be under the control of any particular interest of men then the state must be made stronger, certainly not weaker.⁶³

To answer the pluralist arguments adequately, Hocking goes quite carefully into this problem of sovereignty. It suggests to him some distinct values of the state.

(3) Right of sovereignty.

Before any decision as to the justification of the state's assumption of sovereignty, one must first determine the distinction between the state and other groups within society. Hocking has done this on the basis of extent in space and time, relations between members, origins, and types of power. Each of these can be taken up briefly.

(a) State distinguished from other groups.

In spatial extent, Hocking says that "It is not alone the state that is everywhere: it is each state that is everywhere."⁶⁴ This he asserts because of the interpenetration of the interests of states. And just because the state is so world-wide, allowing the proper qualification of the term, it makes it possible for all other groups to be just as large or small, as provincial or universal as they need to be. The expansion of the territorial interests of any state has not caused the limitation of any of the other groups, but rather the contrary. In the same way, the permanency of the state or aim of permanency, its time-extent, has been of definite value in the conservation of the worth of other social groups. It has aided their permanency. This will be touched on under the purposes of the state.

The state has for its basis of membership the most inclusive of bases. Whereas other groups choose blood relationships, interests,

skills or what-not, the state's membership includes all within a given territory. This territorial bond, "coresidence", is not the essential of political membership,⁶⁴ but it is its "sufficient sign". The very inclusiveness of the state, Hocking feels, lends greater opportunity and freedom to other groups to utilize the more personal bonds.

The state is distinguished from many social groups in that its origin is natural rather than artificial. That is, a permanent need demands its existence whereas most groups are formed voluntarily on transient needs. Here Hocking rejects the contract-theory of the state. "The state originates in man's natural impulse to become the conscious arbiter of his own social destiny." ⁶⁵

Groups may have at least three types of power: physical force,⁶⁶ the power of bargain, and the power of prestige. The state has all three but it is only in the first that it claims any distinction. Here it tends to monopolize the right to use force in order to make possible the free play of the other types of power in society. The possibility of physical force usually prevents the full development of prestige and bargain power and therefore it must be eliminated as much as possible between individuals or groups of society. This can be done only by placing the right of force in the hands of that organization which represents the total will, not the partial will,⁶⁷ of society,⁶⁸ and which will thus relate moral power with physical. That organization is the state. Thus the state can be distinguished from other social groups not only by its extent in space and time, its basis of membership,⁶⁹ and its origin,⁷⁰ but by its unique monopoly of physical force. In each of these cases the state has claimed priority in one way or another over other social groups, and has felt itself justified because,

by so doing, it allows and aids the necessary freedom of development of other groups, and the establishment of right relationships between them.

(b) Meaning of its sovereignty.

If this be true,⁶⁵ and Hocking believes it so, the state's right of sovereignty has been practically established. The state does not claim exclusive control of authority,⁶⁶ and sovereignty does not mean that. When a supreme authority is formed,⁶⁷ it does not abolish the less important ones. It helps to relate them properly to each other. Also, when a state claims sovereignty,⁶⁸ it does not claim to be above reproach. Sovereignty does mean,⁶⁹ according to Hocking, "that capacity for reaching a final decision which is involved in the power to act at all."⁶⁶ This involves moral responsibility. Sovereignty also means that the decisions of the state,⁷⁰ just because they can be final,⁷¹ must take precedence over the decisions of individuals and groups.

Hocking fails to satisfy in this discussion. He has failed, for one thing, to distinguish the state clearly from other organizations. MacIver⁶⁷ has criticized his use of the will to power as the distinguishing basis of the state on the grounds that many other phases of society, for example, the economic order,⁷² are based on the same central instinct. This hardly seems valid,⁷³ however,⁷⁴ because Hocking's claim is that the whole will to power, and not any partial expression of it, demands the state.⁷⁵ The economic order does not reveal the whole will. Criticism might better be based on other things. The state's universality permits freedom as to size,⁷⁶ extent,⁷⁷ duration etc. in other groups,⁷⁸ he claims. It ought to, perhaps,⁷⁹ but he sometimes fails to

distinguish between the ideal and the actual. How be sure,⁷⁹ for example,⁸⁰ whether the expansion of the state makes possible the expansion of the economic interests,⁸¹ or vice versa? Which is the cause and which the effect?

Sabine⁶⁸ points out Hocking's avoidance of the whole modern issue between the functional and territorial theories of the state's membership. He simply assumes the latter. MacIver⁶⁷ suggests that the differentia of the state might be,⁸² not in the instincts,⁸³ will,⁸⁴ or any attribute of human nature at all,⁸⁵ but in its use of a particular medium such as law. Hocking has sought an apriori theory of the state, has tried to meet its difficulties,⁸⁶ but inevitably has been too normative because of his method. ⁶⁸

But it is a normative discussion that we need. We are seeking not only for the values to be found in the state but also for the ideals which Hocking holds for the state,⁸⁷ and though he has dealt too briefly with the critics of the state,⁸⁸ on the whole his arguments for its necessity and its right of sovereignty have been well founded. He has studied the state and placed it in its own relationship to the satisfaction of the will to power,⁸⁹ his ultimate goal.

2. Purpose: the establishment of the objective conditions of the will to power.

We have been dealing with the necessity for the state, not only justifying its existence and its sovereignty, but declaring that without it certain essential conditions which are needed by individuals to satisfy their wills to power can not be supplied. We turn to the purpose of the state. In outlining its purpose Hocking has given his conception of what it ought to provide. We complete here, then, his ethical theory of the state.

In a preliminary discussion of the state's purpose Hocking points to its function of making history and defines history as a series of important happenings which result from the choice, based on intelligence and experience, of any group of people.⁶⁹ Yet the making of history has no value in itself. The state makes history for the sake of the interests of its members.

"Its function as educator is its most characteristic function, and its chief contribution to history is its product in men. . . the form of the state's aim is the making of history; its substance is the making of men." ⁷⁰

This broad statement has been severely criticized because it assumes a task which is certainly not unique with the state. Neither has it been true that education is its characteristic function. One writer⁷¹ has said that there is a conflict between Hocking's head and his heart. He sometimes lets his enthusiasm for the state overrule his impartial analysis of its functions. He sometimes credits it with values which it has made possible but which are not due to itself alone.

In a later discussion he goes more deeply into the purpose:

"The state exists for the sake of making it possible for individual men to realize their fully interpreted wills to power. . . Briefly, the state exists to establish the objective conditions for the will to power in human history: this is our thesis." ⁷²

The objective conditions necessary have already been briefly mentioned: a permanent order; an available storehouse of wisdom; and impersonal justice. These are summed up in objective right.

a. A permanent order.

Man naturally desires his work to have permanent effect,⁷³ yet in himself there is no way to insure it. The state exists as a dependable and permanent,⁷⁴ or would-be permanent,⁷⁵ organization which can assume the responsibility of preserving the values which are

created within it. The will to power has found this method of securing its full realization. The state offers it the value of a future which is more or less calculable and preserves the cumulated values of the past so that the various arts, enterprises and culture have the opportunity of continuous progress. By this assurance of permanence it stimulates creative effort on the part of individual wills, for it enables men to build their work into the whole process of history.

b. An available storehouse of wisdom.

The second purpose of the state closely supplements the first. In order to realize their "fully interpreted wills to power", men must be able to work with as little waste of time and energy as possible. The state exists to store up the wisdom acquired in the past and make it available for men. This function is the law-making and law-administering activity of the state. "Law makes men aware of the bearings of their actions." ⁷³ That is, it points out the consequences which the individual alone cannot see. It shows the relation of his act to the acts and the welfare of others. It can do this because of its long, cumulative experience. Another value which the state provides through its law is the proper relating of the standards of the different groups which it includes. For example, attention has often been called to the divergence between the social code and the economic code. One set of morals is adopted in social life, another, perhaps, in business life. It is the duty of the state, as Hocking sees it, to relate these properly, unifying them under a single ideal, on the principle that:

"Nothing can be socially right which is economically wrong;
 Nothing can be economically right which is socially wrong;
 - the long run being understood in each case." ⁷⁴

No individual can do this and make it effective to the extent to which the state can.

c. Impersonal justice.

The third objective condition of the will to power which the state exists to establish is a condition of justice. This is more than an interest in just behavior. It is an attempt to create a condition in which all men, even those with weak tendencies toward righteousness, may deal fairly as a rule rather than as an exception. It is an attempt to build a just state of mind. "It means the elimination of irrelevant disabilities in every interest of life." ⁷⁵ For instance, if sex does not influence voting capacity, then the state in establishing justice must eliminate that irrelevant factor.

In order to establish justice the state must undertake some educational activity for the sake of developing the personality of its members. Personality alone, Hocking asserts, estimates fairly the worth of the things it produces. This of course is an ideal aim which the state can never realize, but it must strive toward its attainment.

In his little book on the Present Status of the Philosophy of Law and of Rights, Hocking emphasizes this ideal of justice. It is stated negatively as "no injustice." ⁷⁶ That is, no deliberate sacrifice of justice should ever be allowed. The true standard for setting up laws is the development of the powers of the individual. Whatever is certainly known to promote this end is valid as law. Social utility has often aided in determining this law. Self-development is the only natural right. In order to secure this the individual has the right of personal liberty:

in self-management, in seeking social control, and in the control of nature.⁷⁷ He also has the right of security in his environment: security of his own person, of his contracts and of his property. Each of these rights is a condition of justice which the state should aim to secure.

Hocking admits that these three purposes of the state are ideal ones, each of which is being realized by particular states to a very imperfect degree. Nor could they ever be carried out completely, at least not by the state alone. Therefore the state must be an experimenter more than a dictator. In recognizing itself as experimental, it wins its "contact with perfection".⁷⁸ In holding itself open to criticism and change it is justified in demanding that its experiments be carried through to a final proof or disproof.

There is no objection to the setting of high ideals for the state. The only question is whether the ideals are distinctive of the state. In setting up the satisfaction of the will to power, or self-development, as the end, Hocking is in danger of making the scope of the state's functions too large, for that is the end of the whole of life. The only limitation he sets is that the state shall establish the objective conditions for the will to power. Presumably something else establishes the subjective conditions, perhaps religion. But do not other social groups besides the state establish objective conditions for the will to power? He himself admits that the state could never carry out these purposes alone. It seems then that he might have distinguished more carefully the specific values which the state exists to ensure. Sabine in particular makes this criticism.⁷⁹

The chief criticisms of Hocking's theory of the state all

center around his exaggerated idealism. He claims too much for it. Yet the ideal values which he sees possible in it are consistent with his whole ethical theory. He looks to religion to aid the state in fulfilling its high purposes.

3. The state and the church.

There is one more phase of Hocking's ethical theory of the state which we must consider, and that is its relation to the church. The aims of church and state lost their identity when the church rejected territorial limitations, became consciously universal, and clearly distinguished its religious interests from the political ones. The state is not to be worshipped, but rather, is subordinate to religion:

"The good to be realized through religion takes precedence of the good to be achieved through the state, - as the absolute transcends the figurative." ⁸⁰

However, this does not mean that the state is subordinate to the church, for the latter is not as necessary to religion as the organization of the state is to politics, so Hocking believes. What relation then ought to be maintained between the two?

a. Value of religion to the state.

Before determining the relation of the church to the state it is well to note the values contributed by religion to political life. These are: first, the promotion of "human solidarity"⁸¹, a necessary foundation for any grouping of men; second, an interest in the good of mankind as a whole; third, a quickening of conscience and support of the moral precepts stored in the law; fourth, a perspective which stimulates progress.⁸¹ The potential value of each of these to the state is clearly seen.

b. The desired relation between church and state.

Religion brings to the state a conscience, an ethic. The state through its law translates that ethic into its meaning in life. Entire independence of each other is bound to be a failure because each needs the other. The state needs what the church can give, as has been outlined; the church needs to remember the practical problems of the state. The two supplement each other in ministering to the will, religion drawing it back into touch with its ultimate sources, the political life thrusting it out into activity, the use of its powers in the production of character.

The state cannot remain independent of the church's influence; neither can it be passive or neutral in regard to the church's teachings. Hocking shows very convincingly that the state, whether or no, necessarily upholds one religious view or other in its laws, and will if necessary forbid religious practices which go against its concept of justice, for example, polygamy, or human sacrifice. Briefly then, the state and church should each recognize the values in the other, and each be free to oppose or criticize the other, though the influence of the church must come chiefly through the consciences of its individual members, whereas the state works more as a body. Hocking is pleading for greater honesty and realism in the relation between church and state, says one of the reviewers of Man and the State, very appreciatively.⁸²

IV. Art and Religion.

Man's fundamental right is self-development, the satisfaction of his total will to power in its widest reaches of meaning. Both society and the state form objective conditions for the satisfaction of that will. Is anything else necessary? Hocking asserts that there is.

Society may be divided into two orders: the public, which ministers to a man's "market value"; and the private, which satisfies his need for sociability, his instinct for "love". Both of these are necessary to a complete personality, one alternating with the other. The two, however, are not sufficient to "save" the whole man, for the private order stimulates some things for which the public order fails to provide scope and expression. Art and religion exist to take care of this incomplete satisfaction.

In primitive society, Hocking reminds us, vox populi was equivalent to vox Dei. But religion has been superseded in many of its aspects by social laws and the sciences. Its primary purpose, however, is to minister to the whole need of man. Hence, its limitation to the spiritual realm makes it none the less necessary, for by its very nature it supplies that which no other phase of life can supply, and thus completes the total meaning of life.

Originally, art and religion were one. Religion gave birth to the arts, and each to some extent owes its vitality to the initial impulse given it by religion. Therefore the two can well be put together under this section, as Hocking placed them together in the book Human Nature and its Remaking. We shall see what place each holds in his ethical theory.

A. The value of Art.

Art and religion both are in a sense "beyond society", since they "appeal primarily and directly to the exploring and origina-
tive self".⁸³ There are many wishes which find expression only in dreams and in the imagination. No real satisfaction is gained in this way because they are not definite experiences of the will. They need to be expressed more adequately.

1. Scope for unexpressed powers.

Art offers scope for the expression of these desires. "The work of art is the dream made objective, permanent, self-conscious, mutual."⁸⁴ To some extent the satisfaction of art can be only symbolic, and yet the possession of the ideal, the beautiful, in objective form stimulates the creative powers of man. Hocking speaks further of this.

a. Energies increased.

Art has a two-fold effect on the instincts. It makes stronger the impulses to possess, and restores faith in the ability to achieve. In general it increases the energies of life by stimulating desires. And in the second place, it carries those increased energies over into the realm of creativity, the creation of the beautiful which satisfies one phase of the will to power.

b. Ideal of beauty transferred to all life.

There is an indirect effect of art which adds to its value. That is the tendency for the ideal of beauty to be generalized and affect the whole of life. This goes against the current theory that skill gained in one line of work is not transferred to

another. But that theory is not yet firmly established, and, besides, Hocking insists that the aesthetic interest is vital to the central current of the will itself, and hence reaches the whole. For example, the desire for harmony prompts the will to power to identify its interests with the state's interests. It promotes equality between partners in private life. This principle, however, cannot be carried too far. The artist is not necessarily one who finds beauty in the expression of all his instincts. The ideal of beauty is not sufficient to transform all of life.

2. Art not sufficient: religion needed.

The ideal of beauty, taken alone, emphasizes too exclusively the form rather than the content of life. It would serve little in dealing with the difficult problems of the world; it would not approve revolution or reform. Left to itself it would get too far away from reality. It needs to return occasionally to experience, even to a knowledge of evil for which it is trying to offer a solution. It needs religion to aid it in offering the full scope for the satisfaction of man's unexpressed powers, for religion more perfectly supplies the needs of the whole of life. Why this is so we will see in the next section.

B. The God-idea.

Hocking's ethical theory reaches its highest development in religion. Religion, especially Christianity, gives to the will to power its fullest meaning, and enables it to transform the instincts to the furtherance of the highest values. It interprets reality in terms of the good and the divine, and so enables man to relate his values properly to the ideal values. We can best discuss Hocking's views by considering what he means by this characteristic phrase, the "God-idea", and what significance it holds for him in the science of values. We are reminded at once of his term, the whole-idea. What relation do the two bear to each other?

1. The whole-idea as God-idea.

The God-idea is simply the whole-idea interpreted by religion as an idea of a whole which is divine. The God-idea is one kind, and the truest kind of a whole-idea. It enters into man's idea of reality very early. Primitive fears and imagination find the world of Nature insufficient; the sense of mystery already implies a feeling that there is something more, a justice at work, a God. Perhaps the first God-idea is simply the beginning of the recognition that man is not alone in knowing the world. He is largely ignorant, but there is Another that knows. From this simple origin, the idea of God has developed tremendously. It is now not so much a question of whether to believe in God, but what kind of a God to believe in. We are likely to get away from ethics, but it seems necessary to consider briefly why Hocking believes that the whole-idea should be a God-idea, and then what conception he holds of God.

a. Why a God-idea.

In his justification of the interpretation of the whole as divine, Hocking makes his approach through a criticism of the view of McTaggart. McTaggart thinks the belief in God difficult if not impossible because of the presence of evil in the world. Furthermore it is unnecessary, for the values which are commonly attributed to God are reproduced to a sufficient extent in other relationships. But, Hocking says, McTaggart has based his views purely on hypotheses and probabilities. If belief in God is a mere hypothesis then he grants that it has no value for him. On the contrary, he feels that it is based on experience. Men note the powers in Nature, the unifying of forces, and work back to a Power, God. As for the personal and moral aspects, they too have been experienced and are continually being experienced. Even pain and evil are "transmuted" by association with God.⁸⁶ Experience itself justifies the idea of God as the whole-idea.

But granted that man has these experiences there is still the necessity of attributing them to some source. Why should it be God? Hocking falls back on the ontological argument for the existence of God. Man has an idea of God. This implies an experience of God; therefore there is such a reality. This "leap from idea to reality" forms a proof of God's existence.⁸⁷

"It is . . . when the world ceases to satisfy us as a premise, and appears as a conclusion from something more substantial, that we find God - proceeding then from the world as conclusion to God as premise."⁸⁸

The ontological argument has its dangers and faults but Hocking is be commended for his use of an empirical rather than a purely apriori basis.⁸⁹ Hocking has gone beyond Hegel's ontological argument chiefly in this respect. The appeal to

experience must be firmly grounded. Hocking does this as he takes up worship and mysticism.

b. The attributes of God.

If one's whole-idea must be a God-idea,⁸⁸ what kind of a God most truly represents reality? It is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss fully Hocking's treatment of the idea of God. Let it suffice to point out some of the things which he believes about God, for as we shall see, it is the God-idea which determines values for him, and we are interested in values.

God is for Hocking both immanent and transcendent.⁹⁰ He is both within and beyond the world, as its center of power, its will. God is moral, favoring the good of men.⁹⁰ God is personal from one point of view in his external relation as Other to men; impersonal as Law, Energy, the Whole; yet personality is the stronger idea of the two, and can include the idea of law. This is confusing but Hocking seems to come definitely to the personal view.

"The relations between man and God have, in the course of religious history, become more deeply personal and passionate . . . The soul finds at length its divine companion."⁹¹

God is not finite; there is no value in a finite God, for relationship with Him must be far above the plane of human relationships of love, loyalty, etc.⁹² He is the Absolute; the only term which is great enough to hold true through every expansion of our understanding of Him. (We might say, also, which is therefore in danger of being meaningless.) Since He is changeless, it is we who furnish the change in the world. The Absolute is necessarily indifferent in some aspects, yet the indifference is absolute justice: the "only radically creative attitude yet known".⁹³ It is creative in that it confers value on all the objects of its attention.

One of the most fruitful of Hocking's ideas of God, is one that has already been implied. We can know God, chiefly through worship, and can establish a personal relationship with Him, the implications and values of which will be discussed shortly.

c. The God-idea as chief determinant of values.

Just as we found that man's whole-idea determined the level of his values by giving him a standard by which to judge them, so the God-idea functions in the same way.

"The use of the God-idea . . . will be the chief determinant of the value-level in any consciousness." ⁹⁴

And again,

"That which chiefly marks the religious soul is a fearless and original valuation of things . . . as if by fresh contact with truth itself, it were sure of its own justice." ⁹⁵

The nearer one's whole-idea approaches the true God-idea, the more will one's values be the ideal values. They will be seen in their proper relationship, in the right perspective. False values can be discarded. Religion aids this approach. Perhaps its chief value for man lies in this formation of the God-idea.

2. Union with God as the good.

The God-idea which interprets values must also interpret the full meaning of the will to power. In religion man seeks to unite his will with the will of the world, the will of God. Worship is the attempt to so unite with God, to become, for the time being at least, "what existence is", ⁹⁶ and it is religion's claim that this union with God is the good, the supreme value, for it places man, it makes life significant in the world; it offers the final satisfaction of the will to power. Let us see how this is possible and why it is true.

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And again,

"That which chiefly makes the religious soul is a feeling and original valuation of things . . . as if by direct contact with truth itself. It were some of its own justice."²⁶

The nearer one's whole-life approaches the true God-Idea, the more will one's values be the ideal values. They will be seen in their proper relationship, in the right perspective. False values can be discarded. Religion aids this approach. Perhaps the chief value for man lies in this formation of the God-Idea.

d. Union with God as the good.

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a. Asceticism.

Union with God cannot become literal. It is impossible to be a thorough ascetic, to give up all connections with the world and still maintain life. The principle of alternation needs to be applied here as elsewhere. That is, man needs to alternate between the different parts of his life just as he needs to sleep in order to be more fully awake, or needs to play in order to work the harder. And there is also need of alternation between the whole and the parts. Man cannot do justice to his various duties unless he occasionally surveys them as a whole; but it would be equally impossible to be surveying the whole continuously. The ascetic who seeks union with God must seek also his fellow men if his religious experience is to have meaning for himself or them. It is equally true that all who lead lives of constant activity weaken spiritually and need to turn to God for a renewal of spiritual poise. It is in worship that man gives up the partial expressions of his will and finds the whole.

b. Worship and mysticism.

These two may be classed together, for, in Hocking's opinion, the mystic is the one who achieves to a greater degree what the ordinary man seeks in worship. The values which result from mysticism are the standards by which to evaluate the results of all worship, and the methods of the mystics will presumably aid any religious person who seeks to worship truly.

(1) The purpose of worship.

The purpose of worship has already been spoken of as the attainment of union with God. Hocking has much to say of this.

Worship is thought,⁹⁶ meditation, the use of our ideas of God; but it is more than that. It involves the will and "enacts the presence of God, sets God into the will to work there." ⁹⁷ It is more than observation, it is a sharing in the will of the divinity. There is the assumed need of activity which has found partial satisfaction in the various ceremonies and rites of worship but greater satisfaction in application to daily life.

Worship has at times been associated with extreme states of enthusiasm, and with fanaticisms which have too often discredited mysticism; but it is undeniable that there have been some true mystics. These have found communication with God, and their lives and the authority of their teachings have witnessed to it. The impulse for worship or mysticism has not gone. Every man has a "spiritual ambition",⁹⁸ a desire to know and approach God,⁹⁹ to be known by God, and to be recognized for his worth. The strong man seeks his Strongest in the desire to place his strength.⁹⁸ The wear and tear of our strenuous activities makes the values of the details of life seem doubtful. We need the vision of the whole again. We turn instinctively to friendships, to art, to pleasure, and all these help to recover our values; but worship is the self-conscious, the deliberate search for a renewal of the worth-while-ness of life. Work and worship need to alternate.

The mystics have sought this union with God through purgation: self-denial; meditation on God or on objects which embody the supreme values; and passivity,¹⁰⁰ a recognition that their own efforts are not sufficient, an attentive expectancy of some external power. The result of this preparation has been illumination and a sense of union with the supreme being which has been **very** real but is often difficult if not impossible to explain in words.

It is a solitary experience. The mystic experience does not come in a crowd, but the truest mystics have been those who have gone back to the masses with the light of a new truth on their faces and an urge to impart it to all. The same principle of alternation which has already been spoken of under asceticism applies to the mystic.

(2) Revelation,

Union with God is the general expression for the good which comes from religion. There are three more specific values which are found through worship. These are, in Hocking's words, revelation, inspiration, and prophetic consciousness. He discusses them at some length in his book The Meaning of God in Human Experience, and to some extent in his article on the "Illicit Naturalizing of Religion", though under different terminology.

The truth which is revealed to the worshipper may not always be new, but it is his own experience of God and that in itself has value. It may not even be clearly defined. He is more sure that he has truth than of what the truth is. He is in danger of supplying the meaning himself, but at least he has been assured of God's existence and knows that communication with Him is possible. And when he returns to the world he finds himself looking at it from a new viewpoint. This has helped to uncover new truth, new ideas of God, new conceptions of law and right, as a change in one's whole-idea produces a new conception of value. There is much partial truth but, recognizing the possible errors, revelation nevertheless has been of real value to mankind.

(3) Inspiration.

A second specific value of worship is what Hocking calls inspiration. The new insight, revelation, comes with sufficient force to break the old traditional systems of moral thought which have lost their originality and to give them new significance, or else to discard them for better ones. This is the creativity of religion. Hocking recalls to our minds some incidents in Tolstoy's life which illustrate this creativity of a new realization of the meanings of hitherto unquestioned beliefs. He describes the value of inspiration elsewhere as "securing freedom by breaking through the determinisms of habit, mood and thought."⁹⁹ Religion is false unless it does thus intensify other values,¹⁰⁰ unless it does create. Such inspiration usually comes as a result of reflection, in worship. It is not found only in religion, but has its fullest development there. "Worship is the provision which the spiritual constitution has made for its own perpetual amendment."¹⁰⁰

(4) Prophetic Consciousness.

The third value of religion and hence of its distinguishing characteristic worship is "prophetic consciousness". This, as we understand Hocking's view, is an understanding of the world and its purposes such that the person holding it is able to say that this which I now do will succeed, will take its place in the history of the world and will promote its fundamental purposes. The men who have been so assured of the future of their work have been called prophets. Their prophetic consciousness is a result of their revelation and inspiration. It is the highest necessary condition of happiness,¹⁰¹ for happiness is "the continuous undivided consent of my whole-idea to the experience or activity at hand."¹⁰²

Man must be assured not only of the triumph of God or of some principle but he must be able to direct his own efforts so as to share in that triumph. Though Hocking does not use the word, his meaning here includes the thought of cooperation with God in the work of the world.

It is a great thought. Some have drawn back from it as too presumptuous, too closely associated with a love of power which might become exaggerated and self-aggressive as the conception of Nietzsche tends to be. But there have been great men who have stood out, sure of their message, firm through all opposition. These have given the ideal. It points toward immortality. "Our life is given us: another may be acquired. Immortality, I venture to think, may be the chief and total object of prophetic consciousness." 103

Prophetic consciousness is contagious just as the assurance and courage of leaders is contagious. It creates power in others and hence tends to mold its environment. It builds up around itself the unity of purpose which is needed to insure the continuance of its influence. The religious institution develops for this purpose, to propagate and give permanence to these prophetic ideals of men.

c. Relation to problem of evil.

If union with God is to be taken as the good, what does it have to say of the problem of evil? The Realists would say that evil is evil and nothing else. This view is not compatible with religion as Hocking sees it. Therefore it is necessary, for him, to understand evil as something else than pure evil. As a matter of fact, he reminds us, men have always assumed that pain can be explained in terms of good. They have often seen it transmuted.

C. Christianity.

We have been studying the God-idea in general. The special requirements, and implications of the Christian God-idea, as Hocking sees them, are the subject of this section.

1. Feeling versus behavior.

The distinctive thing in the ethic of Christianity is that it places primary value on the attitude, the feeling, the spirit, rather than on external behavior. Its God is one who "loves mercy and not sacrifice", and this idea of God affects the whole value-level. Hocking suggests the results most interestingly. But first we would suggest that he might better have used his term "idea-feeling" here. He has made idea the basis and feeling the accompaniment, necessarily involved but not quite so important or permanent.¹⁰⁵ His use of the word feeling here might very easily be understood as pure emotion, which is far from his meaning.

a. Value placed on Love.

Christianity's chief emphasis is on Love, a spirit, a "feeling", rather than a type of behavior. "Thou shalt love thy God . . . and . . . thy neighbor." Notice, Hocking says, Jesus' expansion of this thought in the Sermon on the Mount. "Ye have heard it said, Thou shalt not kill. . . but I say unto you, Whoever is angry . . . " The command to modify our emotions is usually taken as psychologically impossible and therefore many have changed Christian teachings into a set of rules for behavior. Hocking feels that this misses entirely the whole significance of Christianity. It means to ask just that which at first seems to be impossible.

The question is, can all of it be so changed?

Pain seems to be transmuted through association. Suffering is forgotten in a common cause. May it not be, then, that all possible evil, even including human sin, is transmuted through association or union with God who is greater than all human groupings and above their defects? Only a supreme power could necessarily effect the change from evil to good. Only a power with whom men could get in personal relationship would be able to give to men the poise necessary to face evil fearlessly. And such a power is God. It is

"God as intimate, infallible associate . . . that alone is capable of establishing human peace of mind and thereby human happiness." 104

(1) Pacifism transferred to creative life.

Pacifism, like the other instincts, is modified & refined by the critical judgment and the moral sense of the society. However, it is not changed enough to give the religious sense of Christianity "Do not evil; love your neighbor." Will such a program of non-resistance ever achieve its purpose? It seems to do away with justice itself, and yet Christianity asserts that to return evil for evil is defeat. Is a non-violent response? The creative response is to reflect in the opponent the ideal self of the opponent by treating him as his best self should be treated? Non-resistance seems "with the force of a new idea." 105 This kind of response does not destroy evil by force but it destroys evil by destroying the enemy, as it were, the will of its opponent.

b. Transformation of instincts required.

The emphasis on love in Christianity requires for its fulfillment the complete transformation of the instincts. Especially must the will to power, that most central of all instincts, be brought under the guidance of its principle, for no religion can exist over instincts which have been merely repressed. Its strength must be in their transformation, in their subordination to its purposes. Two examples will suffice to show Hocking's conception of how Christianity satisfies this requirement: the transformations of pugnacity and ambition- those which seem most opposed to the idea of love.

(1) Pugnacity transformed to creative impulse.

Pugnacity, like the other instincts, is modified a great deal by the critical judgments and the educational programs of society. However, it is not changed enough to meet the requirements of Christianity: "Resist not evil"; "Love your enemy". Will such a program of non-resistance ever satisfy pugnacity? It seems to do away with justice itself, and yet Christianity asserts that to return evil for evil is unjust, is a mechanical response. The creative response is to refuse to do the expected thing, to resist not evil, but to appeal to the possible, the ideal self of the opponent by treating him as his best self should be treated. Non-resistance comes "with the force of a new idea".¹⁰⁶ This kind of response alone will satisfy pugnacity for it destroys evil by destroying the source, by reforming the will of its opponent.

It is difficult to make non-resistance appear different from weakness. It must be used honestly and significantly. Sometimes, Hocking thinks, the conditions must be created under which the opponent will listen to the language of non-resistance, especially in the case of international disputes. This makes wars necessary! This is a slender justification for war. The principle might hold true in personal relationships where it is possible to administer discipline in a spirit of love, but with nations? Who would believe in the "still small voice" of non-resistance after the use of the tremendous resistance forces in operation in modern warfare? And where is Hocking disposing of his theory that changes in character must come through changes in world-view, transformations of the will, rather than through forced modification of behavior? Neumann in his review of Human Nature and its Remaking calls attention to the weakness in this argument. 107

It is true, as Hocking says, that the antagonisms and competitions of life cannot be entirely done away with. Pugnacity still has the task of opposing difficulties. But the antagonistic attitudes must be subordinated to this creative attitude into which Christianity has transformed the instinct of pugnacity.

(2) Ambition transformed to the passion for soul.

Christianity will not permit the usual ambitions of wealth, prestige, etc. It substitutes a new one of service. "He who would be great must be servant of all." The start of this transformation is effected by the natural dialectic of the will. We have already seen how the desire for selfish power becomes a desire for power to benefit others. This in itself is the essence

of service. Christianity's contribution is in adding a high interpretation of the goal of this service, expressing it as "the conferring of spiritual life".¹⁰⁸ Ambition thus becomes,¹⁰ when transformed by Christianity, the "passion for souls", to quote Hocking's use of an old phrase. This is the most characteristic effect of Christianity on behavior. The passion for souls is the ultimate transformation not only of ambition,¹⁰ but of pugnacity, and the will to power which controls all the instincts; for the will to power can be fully realized only when others as well as itself are "saved".

Lest this passion for souls seem too far away from the practical side of religion, Hocking hastens to insist that the souls of men must be approached through their social and physical relationships. He commends the mission enterprises which include medical, educational and other services with their religious efforts, and condemns those religious institutions which do not.

2. Salvation: right valuing.

Christianity has required the transformation of the instincts into the form of a desire to "save" others. And since it places its greatest emphasis on love as an attitude and as a feeling,¹⁰ rather than on any specific conduct which might grow out of it, the one who is "saved" must acquire this attitude first of all. Hocking has called salvation a matter of "right valuing" rather than a matter primarily of right action.¹⁰⁹ But it is much more difficult to change one's value-attitudes than to change behavior. How is this transformation possible?

a. The human agency.

The Christian has a desire to save others and that should be his task, but it is a very presumptuous one. He who thinks himself able to save others is not likely to win many followers. We need too much transformation ourselves to be able to transform others. The human agent of salvation is insufficient. Christianity, however, does not allow the missionary zeal to cool so quickly. It does not suppose that man alone can save his fellow men, but it does say that man in "participation" with God can do so. It is not presumptuous to attempt to save others when the merit goes to something beyond ourselves. It is not even necessary to wait until our own state of right valuing has been perfected for that time never comes. We must know God and hence to some extent become like Him, participate in His nature. If we can do that we can save others through Him. But how can we know God? No worship of any sort is sufficient to reveal God to us if our own efforts are all that are involved. Does Christianity have any way of helping us to know God?

b. The Divine aggression.

Christianity recognizes that the human being alone is able to save neither himself nor others. Therefore salvation must ultimately come from without. The history of religions has shown a leaning toward those which offer divine aid; psychology points to a moral appetite which, like curiosity, is seeking new attitudes.¹¹⁰ Christianity depicts God as an "aggressive lover" seeking where He may reveal Himself to men. His is an active pursuing love; His is a will to power which is bent on saving

others. With man seeking God and God seeking man it is possible for man to find Him and know Him. And in knowing Him he has found those true values which mark him as saved, and enable him to lead others to the same experience.

It is difficult to criticize beliefs with which one is in fundamental agreement, as we are in this whole section on religion. Hocking has given a clear, interesting and worthwhile interpretation of the values of religion and its place in the "remaking" of human nature. His discussion of worship and mysticism, and his account of the transformation of the instincts under the influence of Christianity are especially fine. His definition of salvation as right valuing is a helpful contribution to the meaning of that much misunderstood term.

But there are some questions which arise and some criticisms which need to be made of his treatment of religion. He speaks of union with God as the good yet is not definite as to just what he means by union. Sometimes it is the climax of the extreme mystical experience of which he speaks. But that is a good which not everyone can attain, and he has said that whatever the good may be it should at least be possible for every man to achieve it to some degree. He seems inconsistent here. Sometimes, however, he speaks of union in terms of prophetic consciousness, approaching the thought of cooperation with God in His purposes for the world. The latter conception of union is not only nearer the possible reach of men, but it is the better expression of the good from the standpoint of the satisfaction of the will to power. Union with God is an instrumental good since it produces revelation, inspiration and prophetic consciousness. Is it also

an intrinsic good? If so, how is it related to the value of the realization of the will to power?

Any discussion of mysticism will arouse criticism from one angle or another, for it is a field in which it is very difficult to be sure of facts. It is not our place to criticize Hocking's views on mysticism except in their relation to ethics. In this connection Macintosh ¹¹¹ has claimed that Hocking overestimates the values of mysticism, and underestimates the practical side of religion. Hocking states the necessity of a recourse to worship after great activity, but does not emphasize sufficiently the necessity of working after worship. In other words Macintosh is saying that Hocking has found values in religion (and has exaggerated them), but has not related them adequately to the work of the will to power in the world. But the criticism seems poorly founded. Hocking lays his emphasis on worship just because it provides man with the truth, the incentive, and the assurance necessary for his "practical" religion. He has shown that without worship man cannot work, and has also insisted that religion is useless unless it does stimulate work and creativity in man.

Another criticism has been made by Moore ¹¹² in his review of Human Nature and its Remaking. Hocking claims that religion provides a direct and adequate realization of the will to power. If so, then why retain the inadequate forms of realization? For example, it is possible to follow Hocking's theory thus: man's will to power finds satisfaction and realization in society and the state, the latter existing we remember, primarily for the purpose of establishing the objective conditions for the will.

The guiding principle in its development is the whole-idea of the individual. But the truest conception of the whole is the God-idea which religion offers. Therefore in religion man finds the truest and perfect realization of his will to power. The conclusion is likely to be drawn, if one is to be logical, that the less complete conditions for the realization of the will to power are no longer necessary. In other words Hocking has not sufficiently related his various satisfactions of man's central instinct, or else we have failed to read him aright.

Is not the answer just this? Hocking implies it but does not perhaps clarify it enough. Society and the state provide the objective conditions for the will to power, the kind of world in which it can develop; religion provides the best subjective conditions for its realization, the truest idea of reality, and hence the highest value-level and an effective stimulus for growth. Both are necessary as Hocking insists several times. 113

CONCLUSION:

As was stated in the Introduction, Hocking's ethical theory is significant because of the wide range of the study on which it is based, and its consequent range of application. Although his greatest book and his greatest contribution are in the philosophy of religion, nevertheless he has done valuable work in the philosophy of the state and has contributed some to psychology and other sciences. All these lines of thought have left their stamp on his ethical theory. It is more coherent because of them.

Hocking's contribution to ethics is not primarily in the goal which he sets for life. The realization of the will to power, or self-development, as he calls it in the Present Status of the Philosophy of Law and of Rights, is practically the same as the self-realization of many other ethical writers. It is in his interpretation of the desired satisfaction of the will to power that we are interested. It is notable that he has put satisfaction, not primarily in the realm of the instincts and impulses of man, not even primarily in the realm of feeling and emotion, but in the realm of the will and the intellect. The will's function is to control, and organize the instincts of man, making them promote a unified purpose. The intellect's function is to guide the formation and development of that purpose. Through knowledge it determines the best means of satisfying man's desire for "power", taking into consideration the social life that is involved. Hocking puts a maximum responsibility on man's ability to mold his own character. He is not mechanized or predetermined by his inherited nature, his subconscious self or his environment, at least only to a small extent. He has the power of choice, of self-control even to the extent of transforming the most persistent instincts; and to a considerable degree he has the power of molding his environment instead of being molded by it.

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Another very important phase of Hocking's teaching is his emphasis on a synoptic view of value. Good and evil must be judged not by looking at each experience of life separately but by looking at the whole. This prevents an over-emphasis or an under-emphasis on any set of values. Although we doubt that every man has as conscious and formulated a whole-idea as Hocking seems to suggest, yet the ideal which he has set is the only one able to produce a coherent system of values rightly related to each other and to the ultimate goal of life. His standard for finding the true values has not shown partiality to any one phase of life but can be used by all. We only wish that, along with his theory of the whole-idea as determinant of value, he had made some classification of the values as they appear to him. But he has not yet written an ethics book per se.

A third contribution which we see in Hocking's work is his attempt to define the tasks and values of the various agencies which affect man's development. He has dealt only with the major ones of course - society, the state and religion - but has sought the principles which underlie each of those, their justification for existence, their necessity, and finally the ideals which they should strive to attain if they are to fulfil their purpose in relation to the development of the powers in man. As has been said earlier in the thesis, he has to a considerable extent been able to combine a careful, scientific analysis of these institutions with a very idealistic view of their possible values. It is a difficult thing to do, and at times he is too idealistic and fails to make clear the relation between his descriptive and his normative discussions, but every such attempt is of value to the field of ethics which must be built upon thorough understanding of the facts of life. He has applied his own theory of the whole-idea to his work. He has tried in so far as possible to relate the various aspects of life to each other. This is seen even in his books which deal with particular problems rather than general.

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Finally, we believe that Hocking's ethical theory is significant because it is more than a theory. It aids in the understanding of those factors which make the attainment of true value possible in actual living. It claims, for example, and lays a firm basis for its claim, that man can know Reality, can know God, and therefore he has an opportunity to discover truth from falsehood in the realm of value..Hocking finds that in religion, and especially in Christianity, man's whole-idea becomes increasingly perfected; and more than that, his will is given the incentive which makes possible the necessary transformations of character, and the desirable creativity of effort.

We do not say that Hocking has given the only true ethical theory. Far from it, for we cannot even claim ability to judge this theory in relation to other theories. But we do say that these things in Hocking's ethics are significant: he has placed self-development in the realm of the will and the intellect, and thereby has attributed great freedom to man in the control of self and the formulation of character; he has emphasized the necessity of a coherent system, or a synoptic view of values; he has made an important contribution in the study of the function and purposes of various important agencies which affect man's development; and finally he has revealed the possibility of the attainment of the ideals which he has set for man, at least he has pointed out wherein that possibility may be found. These are sufficiently important, it seems to us, to attract the attention of any careful student of ethics and make worth while his study of their principles and implications.

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Summary.

We may summarize the results of our study of Hocking's ethical theory as follows:

Human nature inherits a group of instincts. These have no such highly specialized stimulus-response mechanisms as those of lower animals and hence are better able to be modified and controlled. Experience, by means of its pleasure and pain impressions, builds up a policy in the self which guides the activity of the instincts. This ruling policy is the will. It gradually subordinates the instincts to itself and relates them in such a way that they promote its policy.

The will which is fundamental in human nature is inadequately but best expressed as the will to power. Experiences which satisfy this will to power, leaving a sensation or general feeling of pleasure, or a favorable mental-after-image, are sought for, repeated and tend to become habits. Those which do not satisfy the will to power are avoided. Thus the self develops a character.

The natural dialectic of the will tends to the interpretation of power as non-competitive and service-ful rather than as selfish, for this ensures its fullest realization, and the more permanent effect of its work. Society and especially religion aid in this higher interpretation of the will to power. Conscience is the awareness of inconsistency between the expression or activity of specific instincts and the ruling policy of the self in its ultimate meaning. Social tradition and custom help its development, but obligation is primarily an individual experience. It is one of the chief agencies in guiding the transformations of the instincts.

Value lies in the satisfaction of the whole self and not of any partial expressions of the self. Therefore the will to power is justified in its

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Value lies in the satisfaction of the whole self and not of any partial

expressions of the self. Therefore the will to power is justified in its

subordination of some instincts in favor of others. True freedom comes with unity of purpose, not with undisciplined assertion of desire. However, discipline must take the form of sublimation rather than repression.

Values are determined by one's whole-idea, one's world view or conception of reality. This is present from the beginning of consciousness but experience constantly changes and enlarges it. The nearer one's whole-idea approaches reality, the higher will be one's level of values, for reality is essentially good. The whole-idea, under the influence of religion, becomes the God-idea. Sin is the deliberate refusal to act according to the best interests of the will to power, or the refusal to take into account the ultimate meaning of an act in the light of one's whole-idea or God-idea. Sin is possible because of the dilemmas involved in almost every moral choice.

Man's fundamental right is to develop the powers that are in him. In order to do this, he must be aided by society. The good society, that is, the one which promotes the self-development of its members, must comply with the following postulates: its will for the individual must be identical with the individual's best interpreted will for himself; it must subordinate its competitive interests; it must make provision for changing its institutions when they have become useless or out of date; and it must conserve its institutions in proportion to its certainty of their value. These are high ideals for society. Something more definitely organized than society in general is necessary for their realization. This organization is the state.

The necessity of the state is based psychologically on the will-circuits of its members. Will-circuits are the overflow of the wills to power, the extensions of selves in the form of interlocking activities, mutual dependence on certain objects, sources of supply, etc. The state is the necessary expression of these vital circuits. Every man wills the state whether he

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seems conscious of it or not, and the state has the right to the sovereignty it claims not only because of its unique relation to the wills to power, but because by its sovereignty it gives greater freedom of development to all other subordinate groups.

The purpose of the state is to establish those objective conditions which are necessary for the full realization of the will to power. These are: a permanent order, assuring security and permanence to the creative efforts of man; an available storehouse of acquired wisdom, cutting short the time spent in learning by experience, and helping man to learn the best interpretation of his will; and justice, the elimination of unnecessary friction, the securing of a condition in which fair dealing can be the rule and not the exception.

These also are high ideals. The state needs the help of religion in attaining them, for religion promotes the attitudes and interests which make possible the conditions named above. The state and the church should remain separate but each should be free to criticize and supplement the work of the other.

Art and religion both minister to phases of the will to power which are left unsatisfied by society and the state. Art can do this only partially. Religion does it completely. It interprets reality as divine and by this God-idea offers man the opportunity to know true values from false, the best from the good. Through worship man receives some revelation of truth; a creative attitude toward life, or inspiration; and prophetic consciousness, the knowledge of his worth in the world and the ability to place his work in its history. Worship or mysticism leads to what religion claims as the greatest value: union with God; but this union never can be complete. Worship must alternate with work. Evil is transmuted through association with God. It is never pure evil.

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Christianity's chief contribution to morals is its emphasis on feelings and attitudes which are determiners of action rather than on the modes of behavior themselves. It places greatest value on love. This involves a complete transformation of the instincts. The will to power with this new interpretation is able to transform such instincts as pugnacity and ambition into unselfish creative impulses, and ultimately to its own form of a passion for saving the souls of men.

Salvation is an acquiring of this same attitude of love; hence it is a condition of right valuing. It seems presumptuous however for men to claim to save others. In fact they are unable to save themselves by their own efforts, for to be saved, or to value rightly, is to know God, and only the "pure in heart" know God. Christianity meets this difficulty by assuring men that God is seeking to reveal Himself to men as eagerly as they are seeking to know Him. It is this divine aggression which makes the knowledge of God, and hence salvation also, possible. Knowledge of God enables men to some extent to participate in His nature, and in participation with Him, in recognizing dependence on Him, they can without undue presumption share in His task of saving men. The final and highest transformation of the will to power can be achieved and can find its satisfaction through the Christian religion.

We have found the following things significant in Hocking's ethical theory: he has placed self development in the realm of the will and the intellect, and thereby has attributed great freedom to man in the control of self and the formulation of character; he has emphasized the necessity of a coherent system, or a synoptic view of values; he has made an important contribution in the study of the function and purposes of various important agencies which affect man's development; and finally, he has revealed the possibility of the attainment of the ideals which he has set for man, at least he has pointed out wherein that possibility may be found.

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We have found the following things significant in Hooker's ethical theory: he has placed self development in the realm of the will and the intellect, and thereby has attributed great freedom to man in the control of self and the formation of character; he has emphasized the necessity of a coherent system or a synthetic view of values; he has made an important contribution in the study of the function and purpose of various important sciences which affect man's development; and finally, he has revealed the possibility of the attainment of the ideals which he has set for man, at least he has pointed out wherein that possibility may be found.

NOTES

1. Note should be made of the fact that a new book of Hocking's is soon coming out, a book on Freedom. Any later student of his ethical theory should take this into account.
2. W.E.Hocking, The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Human Happiness, see bibliography for further data on this and other references.
3. Sabine, George H., Review of Hocking's Man and the State. Int. Jour. Ethics, 37 (1927), 307-11.
 MacIver, R.M., Review of Hocking, Man and the State. Am Pol. Sci. Rev., 21 (1927), 162-4.
 Laguna, Theodore de., Review of Hocking, Human Nature and its Remaking, Jour. Phil., 16 (1919), 493-99.
 Macintosh, Douglas c., "Hocking's Philosophy of Religion: an Empirical Development of Absolutism." Phil. Rev., 23 (1914), 27-47.
4. Hocking's articles: "Leaders and Led"; "Culture Worth Getting in College"; chapters on Education and on Punishment in Human Nature and its Remaking.
5. Hocking, W.E., Human Nature and its Remaking, p.60.
6. Ibid, pp. 65, 66, 67.
7. Ibid, p.74.
8. Ibid, p. 83.
9. Ibid, p.86.
10. Cf. Bartlett, F. C., Review of Hocking, Human Nature and its Remaking. Hibbert Jour., 17(1919), p.338.
11. Hocking, W. E., Human Nature and its Remaking, p.92.
12. Ibid, p.93.
13. Ibid, p.93.
14. Ibid, p.96.
15. Cf. Ibid, p.97.
16. Salter, William M., Nietzsche the Thinker, p.194, reference to Nietzsche, Will to Power, paragraph 869.
17. Cf. Salter, ibid, pp.372-3, and ref. to Nietzsche, Will to Power, paragraphs 176, 935, 938, etc.
18. Hocking, Man and the State, p.309.
19. Cf. ibid, pp. 1312-16.
20. Cf. Hocking, Human Nature and its Remaking, pp.184-87.
21. Ibid, p.190.

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 Ingalls, Theodore de., Review of Hooking, Human Nature and its Reasoning, Jour. Phil., 16 (1919), 423-24.
 MacIntyre, Alexander, O., "Hooking's Philosophy of Religion: an Epitaphical Development of Absolutism," Phil. Rev., 23 (1914), 27-27.
4. Hooking's articles: "Lessons and Ideals"; "Culture Worth Getting in College"; chapters on Education and on Environment in Human Nature and its Reasoning.
5. Hooking, W.E., Human Nature and its Reasoning, p. 60.
6. Ibid., pp. 66, 67.
7. Ibid., p. 74.
8. Ibid., p. 82.
9. Ibid., p. 83.
10. Cf. Partlett, Y. C., Review of Hooking, Human Nature and its Reasoning, Hibbert Jour., 17 (1919), p. 236.
11. Hooking, W. E., Human Nature and its Reasoning, p. 92.
12. Ibid., p. 93.
13. Ibid., p. 93.
14. Ibid., p. 94.
15. Cf. Ibid., p. 97.
16. Salter, William M., Misconceptions the Student, p. 194, reference to Misconceptions, Will to Power, paragraph 829.
17. Cf. Salter, Ibid., pp. 273-5, and ref. to Misconceptions, Will to Power, paragraphs 176, 230, 231, etc.
18. Hooking, Man and the State, p. 209.
19. Cf. Ibid., pp. 212-13.
20. Cf. Hooking, Human Nature and its Reasoning, pp. 184-87.
21. Ibid., p. 190.

22. Hocking, Man and the State, pp.363-64.
23. Ibid, p.279.
24. Ibid, p.336.
25. Ibid, p.371.
26. Cf. Wilde, Norman, Review of Hocking, Man and the State, Jour. Phil., 24 (1927), p.270.
27. Hocking denies the existence of a "group mind" for the following reasons:
 1. Such a mind would have thoughts, purposes and actions different from those of its members, and hence a character distinct from theirs which could be held responsible. But who is responsible for common property, common expenses and debts? Who besides the members of the group? Yet why should they be thus held responsible if there is a separate entity, a group mind?
 2. Such a mind would presumably be subject to pleasure and pain. It would have to be considered somewhat as a personality. Its formation or its dissolution would be as serious as birth and death. Yet groups are both made and broken easily.
 3. Such a group would remain stable through any changes of leadership. Yet this does not hold true of many groups, not even always of states. If group minds are real why are they so hindered by their tools of expression? Cf. Hocking, Man and the State, pp.339-361, esp.353-61.
That which makes the group more than a summary of its members is the will-circuit which has already been discussed.
28. Hocking, Man and the State, p.236.
29. Hocking, Human Nature and its Remaking, p.118.
30. Ibid, p.123.
31. Cf. ibid, p.22.
32. Hocking, The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Human Happiness, p.6.
33. Ibid, p.14.
34. Ibid, p.24,25.
35. Hocking, Human Nature and its Remaking, p.35.
36. Ibid, cf. p.36.
37. Ibid, p.44.
38. Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, p.64.
39. Ibid, cf. pp.197-98.
40. Hocking, Morale and its Enemies, cf. pp.150-52.
41. Hocking, Review of

32. Hooking, Man and the State, pp. 353-54.
33. Ibid., p. 372.
34. Ibid., p. 355.
35. Ibid., p. 371.
36. Cf. Wilder, Norman, Review of Hooking, Man and the State, Ann. Phil., 24 (1937), p. 270.
37. Hooking denies the existence of a "group mind" for the following reasons:
 1. Such a mind would have thoughts, purposes and actions different from those of its members, and hence a character distinct from theirs which could be held responsible. But who is responsible for common property, common expenses and debts? Who holds the members of the group? Yet why should they be thus held responsible if there is a separate entity, a group mind?
 2. Such a mind would necessarily be subject to pleasure and pain. It would have to be considered somewhat as a personality. Its formation or its dissolution would be as serious as birth and death. Yet groups are both made and broken easily.
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38. Hooking, Man and the State, pp. 353-354, esp. 353-54.
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element which has already been discussed.
39. Hooking, Man and the State, p. 353.
40. Hooking, Human Nature and its Reminders, p. 118.
41. Ibid., p. 123.
42. Cf. Ibid., p. 123.
43. Hooking, The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Human Personality, p. 6.
44. Ibid., p. 14.
45. Ibid., p. 31, 32.
46. Hooking, Human Nature and its Reminders, p. 35.
47. Ibid., cf. p. 35.
48. Ibid., p. 44.
49. Hooking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, p. 55.
50. Ibid., cf. pp. 137-38.
51. Hooking, Human Nature and its Reminders, cf. pp. 130-32.
52. Review of

41. Macintosh, D. C., "Hocking's Philosophy of Religion: an Empirical Development of Absolutism." Phil. Rev., 23 (1914), 27-47.
42. Hocking, Meaning of God in Human Experience, pp.544-45.
43. Ibid, p.129.
44. Hocking, Man and the State, p.237.
45. Cf. Everett, W.G., Moral Values, p.220.
46. Hocking, Human Nature and its Remaking, cf. pp.146-47.
47. For the five dilemmas cf. Ibid, pp. 153-159.
48. Ibid, cf. pp.205-8.
49. Ibid, cf. p. 209.
50. Ibid, p. 213
51. Ibid, pp. 257-69.
52. Ibid. p. 227.
53. Ibid, p. 232.
54. Ibid, p. 248.
55. Ibid, p. 252
56. Hocking, Man and the State, esp. p. 18.
57. Ibid, p. 20.
58. Ibid, p. 309.
59. Cf. The state as will-circuit, p.16-18 of this thesis.
60. Hocking, Man and the State, pp. 380-88, esp. 382.
61. Wilde,, Norman, Review of Hocking, Man and the State, Jour. Phil., 24 (1927), . 267-72.
62. Buchanan, Scott, Review of Hocking, Man and the State, Lit. Rev., 7 (1926), p. 6.
63. Hocking, Man and the State, p. 399.
64. Ibid, p. 116.
65. Ibid, p. 150.
66. Ibid, p. 396.
67. MacIver, R.M., Review of Hocking, Man and the State, AM.Pol. Sc. Rev., 21 (1927), pp. 162-64.

41. Mascherbauer, D. C., "Hölderlin's Philosophy of Religion: an Historical Development of Absolutism." Phil. Rev., 22 (1914), 27-47.
42. Hölderlin, Meaning of God in Human Experience, pp. 244-45.
43. Ibid., p. 129.
44. Hölderlin, Man and the State, p. 237.
45. Cf. Everett, W. G., Moral Values, p. 230.
46. Hölderlin, Human Nature and its Remaking, cf. pp. 143-47.
47. For the five dilemmas cf. Ibid., pp. 152-159.
48. Ibid., cf. pp. 205-8.
49. Ibid., cf. p. 202.
50. Ibid., p. 212.
51. Ibid., pp. 237-38.
52. Ibid., p. 237.
53. Ibid., p. 232.
54. Ibid., p. 243.
55. Ibid., p. 251.
56. Hölderlin, Man and the State, esp. p. 18.
57. Ibid., p. 20.
58. Ibid., p. 209.
59. Cf. The state as will-circle, p. 15-18 of this thesis.
60. Hölderlin, Man and the State, pp. 200-20, esp. 202.
61. Wilde, Norman, Review of Hölderlin, Man and the State, Jour. Phil., 24 (1927), p. 237-72.
62. Buchanan, Scott, Review of Hölderlin, Man and the State, Lit. Rev., 7 (1928), p. 3.
63. Hölderlin, Man and the State, p. 229.
64. Ibid., p. 116.
65. Ibid., p. 150.
66. Ibid., p. 230.
67. Maciver, R. M., Review of Hölderlin, Man and the State, Am. Pol. Sc. Rev., 21 (1927), p. 162-64.

68. Sabine, G.H., Review of Hocking, Man and the State, Int.Jour.Ethics, 37 (1927), p. 309.
69. Hocking, Man and the State, p. 165.
70. Ibid, p. 173.
71. Wilde, Norman, op.cit.
72. Hocking, Man and the State., p. 325.
73. Ibid, p. 326.
74. Ibid, p. 330.
75. Ibid, p. 331.
76. Hocking, The Present Status of the Philosophy of Law and of Rights, pp. 47-51.
77. Ibid, pp. 86-88.
78. Hocking, Man and the State, p. 408.
79. Sabine, op. cit., p. 309.
80. Hocking, Man and the State, p. 415.
81. Ibid, p. 426.
82. Wilde, op. cit., p. 271.
83. Hocking, Human Nature and its Remaking, p. 315.
84. Ibid, p. 340.
86. For further discussion cf. IV, B, 3, c, Relation to the problem of evil, p. 62.
87. Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, p. 307.
88. Ibid, p. 312.
89. Macintosh, D.C., op. cit. p.38.
90. Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, pp. 327-30.
Also cf. Human Nature and its Remaking, p. 352.
91. Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, p. 336. cf. pp333-36.
92. Ibid, p. 225.
93. Ibid, p. 204.
94. Ibid, p. 136.
95. Ibid, p. 28.
96. Ibid, p. 366.

27 (1927) 205

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72. Hocking, Man and the State, p. 333.

252. 1914, D. 326.

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72, 101d, p. 321.

• 53-75

77, 161d, pp. 22-23.

76. Hocking, Men and the State, p. 408.

79. Sabine, op. cit., p. 309.

61. 1614, D. 435.

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84. Ibid. p. 240.

88-1014-6-313

89. McIntosh, D.C., op. cit. p. 38.

92. 1014. D. 852.

22. 1974, D. S. 4.

94. Ibid., p. 130.

92 . 5161 . 52

92, 101, 108, 110.

97. Ibid, p. 342.
98. Ibid, cf. pp. 359-60.
99. Hocking, W.E., "Illicit Naturalizing of Religion." Jour. Phil., 3(1923), 568.
100. Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, p. 364.
101. Hocking, The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Human Happiness, p. 25.
102. Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, p. 492.
103. Ibid, p. 514.
104. Ibid, p. 224.
105. Cf. II, B, 1, Idea basic in morals, p. 22.
106. Hocking, Human Nature and its Remaking, p. 374.
107. Neumann, Henry, Review of Hocking, Human Nature and its Remaking. Survey, 40 (1918), p. 670.
108. Hocking, Human Nature and its Remaking, p. 398.
109. Ibid, p. 418.
110. Ibid, p. 421.
111. Macintosh, D.C., op. cit., pp.40-41.
112. Moore, A.W., Review of Hocking, Human Nature and its Remaking. Int. Jour. Ethics, 29 (1919). p. 231.
113. Cf. III, B, 3, The state and the church, pp. 49-50.

97. Ibid., p. 313.

98. Ibid., op. cit., pp. 309-31.

99. Hocking, W. E., "Theistic Naturalism of Religion," Johns. Phil., 2(1923), 303.

100. Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, p. 334.

101. Hocking, The Necessity and Religious Conditions of Human Knowledge, p. 28.

102. Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, p. 493.

103. Ibid., p. 314.

104. Ibid., p. 314.

105. Cf. H. E. I., Logic and the World, p. 33.

106. Hocking, Human Nature and Its Reasoning, p. 374.

107. Newman, Henry, Review of Hocking, Human Nature and Its Reasoning, Survey, 40 (1913), p. 370.

108. Hocking, Human Nature and Its Reasoning, p. 378.

109. Ibid., p. 413.

110. Ibid., p. 421.

111. Macintosh, D. G., op. cit., pp. 40-41.

112. Moore, A. W., Review of Hocking, Human Nature and Its Reasoning, Int. Jour. Ethics, 23 (1913), p. 231.

113. Cf. H. E. I., The State and the Church, pp. 48-50.

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